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MORAL CHARACTER, MOTIVE, AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF BLAME
Janice Nadlert & Mary-Hunter McDonnelltt
Criminal law conceives blameworthiness as the carefully calculated end
product of discrete judgments about a transgressor's intentionality, causal
proximity to harm, and the harm's foreseeability. Research in social psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, suggests that blaming is often intuitive and auto-
matic, driven by a natural impulsive desire to express and defend social
values and expectations. Reconciling legal blame with psychological blame is
not always feasible because the law does not always explicitly recognize or
encourage the factors that influence judgments of legal blame. In this Arti-
cle, we focus on two highly related motivational processes-the desire to
blame bad people and the desire to blame people whose motive for acting was
bad. We report three original experiments that suggest that an actor's bad
motive and bad moral character can increase not only perceived blame and
responsibility but also increase perceived causal influence and intentionality.
We show that people are motivated to think of an action as blameworthy,
causal, and intentional when they are confronted with a person who they
think has a bad character even when the character information is totally
unrelated to the action under scrutiny. We discuss implications for doctrines
of mens rea definitions, felony murder, inchoate crimes, rules of evidence,
and proximate cause.
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INTRODUCTION
It is a fundamental tenet of criminal law that we do not judge the
criminality of an act based on the character of the actor. Rather,
"[t]he sun of justice shines alike 'for the evil and the good' . ...
[T]he most vicious [defendant] is presumed innocent until proven
guilty."1 The purpose of a criminal trial, then, is to determine
whether a person committed a criminal act, not whether a person is
good or bad in the abstract. The prosecutor's task is simply to prove
that the defendant's actions meet the statutory elements of a crime;
these offense elements do not require proof of character.2 Blamewor-
thiness, in this context, is the carefully calculated end product of dis-
crete judgments about a transgressor's intentionality, causal proximity
to harm, and the harm's foreseeability. The logic of criminal liability
takes into account a particular harmful act, done with a particular
1 People v. White, 24 Wend. 520, 574 (N.Y. 1840) (opinion of Senator Verplanck),
quoted in IA JOHN HENRY WiGMORE, EVIDENCE IN T~miis AT COMMON LAW § 57, at 1183
(Peter Tillers ed., rev. 1983).
2 See 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETERJ. HENNING, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 409 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011).
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mental state, that caused a particular harmful result. The combina-
tion of these elements determines the blame assigned to the offender;
there is no room in this calculation for varying blame according to the
actor's moral character. 3
Research in social psychology, on the other hand, suggests that
blaming is often intuitive and automatic, driven by a natural, impul-
sive desire to express and defend social values and expectations. 4 In
this way, blaming serves an integral social function. 5 By blaming a
wrongdoer, we establish, enforce, and express the social boundaries
and rules of our community. 6 To this end, people are often willing to
make sacrifices to punish cheaters even when they themselves are not
the cheated victims. 7 Blaming in ordinary social life primarily serves
as an expressive social tool to sort the "bad" members of society from
the "good" members of society and thereby, to foster solidarity and
cohesion among those who are appropriately abiding by social expec-
tations.8 In ordinary social life, therefore, an actor's perceived charac-
ter and reasons for acting are of primary importance to the process of
administering blame for that actor's harmful action. 9
3 But see Kyron luigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 I-LARv. L. REv. 1423, 1458-59
(1995) (arguing that Aristotelian virtue forms the basis for blame and punishment).
4 See Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence andJust Deserts as Motives
for Punishment, 83J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 284, 284-85 (2002); Jonathan Haidt, The
Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108
PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814-18 (2001); David A. Pizarro & David Tannenbaum, Bringing Charac-
ter Back: How the Motivation to Evaluate Character Influences Judgments of Moral Blame, in THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF MORALITY. EXPLORING THE CAUSES OF GOOD AND EVIL 91, 91-93
(Mario Mikulincer & Phillip R. Shaver eds., 2012); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Biaman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 62-64 (2008)
(finding that perceivers' cultural values shape their perceptions of and blame for contested
self-defense killings). For a classic treatment of the function of blame and punishment, see
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 41-60 (W.D. Halls trans., The Free
Press 1984) (suggesting that processes of blaming and punishing allow members of a soci-
ety to express indignation at acts that offend the collective conscience, thereby affirming
collective values and fostering social cohesion).
5 See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLtAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
92-95 (1997); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gfchter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE
137, 137 (2002); J.L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ErHIcs 3,
3-5 (1982); Paul H. Robinson et al., The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1633, 1639 (2007).
6 SeeJonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 316 SCIENCE 998, 998-1001
(2007); Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OFJUsTIcE RESEARCH IN LAW 31,
31-32 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
7 See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms, 25
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 64 (2004).
8 See DuRKHEiM, supra note 4, at 63 ("[P]unishment is above all intended to have its
effect on honest people."); Tom R. Tyler & RobertJ. Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are
Out, but Why? The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAw & Soc'Y REV.
237, 255 (1997); Vidmar, supra note 6, at 49.
9 See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND
CRITICAL ETHICS 465-75 (1959) (suggesting that blameworthy actions are those that would
not occur absent a bad moral character); Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal
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In this Article, we suggest that the legal and social-psychological
processes of blame cannot be completely divorced. Inevitably, social-
psychological processes of blame, which often operate on a level be-
neath conscious awareness, inform and influence formal legal
processes of blame. Specifically, we suggest here that perceptions of
an actor's moral character and motive for acting together affect our
intuitions of blame, responsibility, and ultimately criminal liability for
that actor's harmful act. People have a natural, psychological inclina-
tion to punish others with bad characters who act with bad motives;
that inclination shapes the way that people interpret information in a
formal legal proceeding via a process that we refer to as "motivated
inculpation."10 In a series of original social-psychological experi-
ments, we provide evidence that when people judge a harmful action
performed by a bad person or performed with a bad motive, they are
more likely to perceive that person as more responsible, and the act as
more causal and intentional, than when they judge an identical harm-
ful action performed by a good person or performed with a good mo-
tive. Thus, it is plausible that intuitive and automatic psychological
blaming motivations can permeate more formal legal mechanisms of
blame. Ultimately, this suggests that the social-psychological impulse
to punish bad people who act with bad motives can color the legal
process of blame, such that we are more likely to find that the harmful
action of a bad person satisfies the statutory elements of a crime and
in turn, is worthy of criminal condemnation and punishment.
This Article advances current research and theory in bringing to
light ways in which psychological blaming processes drive legal blame.
Our analysis informs essential normative questions regarding the ex-
tent to which legal processes ought to take into account the psycho-
logical factors that drive the mechanisms of blame. For example, to
what extent and under what circumstances should a court admit into
evidence a defendant's motive for acting and permit it to be consid-
ered in liability judgments? Can the rules of evidence effectively ex-
clude information about moral character, and is exclusion of this
Responsibility, 1 LAw & PHIL. 5, 7 (1982) (arguing that blame and punishment are not
meted for acts at all, but for the character traits indicated by those acts).
10 A number of recent studies examine motivated cognition in law. See, e.g., Kevin M.
Carismith & Avani Mehta Sood, The Fine Line Between Interrogation and Retribution, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 191, 191-96 (2009); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and
Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729,
731-35 (2010); Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw a Protest" Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1755706; Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are
You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 841-43 (2009); Avani Mehta Sood &John M. Darley, The Plasticity of Harm: An Ex-
perimental Demonstration of the Malleability ofJudgments in the Service of Criminaliza-
tion (July 15, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
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evidence a proper goal given how jurors and judges likely use such
information? These normative questions lie at the heart of criminal
adjudication; yet, they are outside the scope of this Article. We can
deal with them only after we gain a deeper understanding of empiri-
cal questions about psychological blaming processes. This Article fur-
thers our understanding of the empirical issues and provides the
groundwork for later normative analyses of the proper role of motive
and character in criminal liability.
In proceeding, we will first discuss differences between legal and
psychological processes of blame with particular focus on the role that
character information plays within each paradigm. The law governing
criminal trials generally attempts to purge character from its blaming
process in several ways. Criminal law itself, especially in its contempo-
rary form, breaks the blaming process into discrete, component
parts-such as act, mental state, attendant circumstances, and result-
and leaves little room for juror judgments about the defendant's
moral character. Moreover, evidence law places strict limits on the
admissibility of character evidence. By contrast, preexisting motiva-
tional factors strongly influence psychological blaming processes and
prompt decision makers to assign importance to factors (like per-
ceived character) that are legally incidental or even irrelevant. In Part
I of this Article, we explore the'criminal law's treatment of moral char-
acter and motive in legal blaming processes, which we later contrast
with psychological blaming processes. In doing so, we draw on
Durkheimian punishment theory and the psychological phenomenon
of motivated reasoning to sketch an account of how information
about a transgressor's character influences perceivers' determinations
of that transgressor's blame and responsibility. In Part II, we present a
test of our theory in a series of three original social-psychological ex-
periments in which we find that perceived bad moral character or per-
ceived bad motive can trigger perceivers' impulses to view an actor's
harmful conduct as more causal, intentional, and blameworthy.
These experimental results show that motivational forces can mold
basic judgments of blame, responsibility, causation, and intentionality
just as readily as everyday perceptions about, say, the adorableness of
our own children or the negligible health implications of that deli-
cious-looking piece of cake on the table. In Part III we analyze some
practical applications of our findings for several legal doctrines in
which evidence of bad moral character or motive may come into play,
such as in proximate cause, felony murder, and the evidentiary treat-
ment of character evidence. Finally, in Part IV we conclude with a
discussion of the limitations of the experiments reported here and
offer directions for further empirical investigation.
2012]
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I
MORAL CHARACTER AND MOTIVE
A. Motive and Character in Legal and Social-Psychological
Processes of Blame
In general, our legal system eschews the role of character in crim-
inal liability determinations, relying instead on an act-based system of
inculpation.11 According to this system, the State's right to impose
blame on an actor derives solely from the actor's commission of a pro-
hibited act.12 Put simply, we blame a criminal for what she did, not
who she is.
That being said, as human beings we are nevertheless naturally
motivated to punish people we see as having a bad moral character or
a lasting criminal disposition. As John Henry Wigmore asserted,
The deep tendency of human nature to punish not because our
[defendant] is guilty this time but because he is a bad man and may
as well be condemned now that he is caught is a tendency which
cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court."13
Similarly, the Supreme Court has warned that evidence of prior crimi-
nal activity to display a "propensity" to commit a crime poses a "risk
that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged-or that,
uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves
punishment."1 4
In an article providing empirical confirmation of this tendency,
Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie P. Hans analyzed a sample of real
jury trials and found that, where the evidence is weak or ambiguous, a
jury that learns of a defendant's prior criminal record is significantly
11 On the other hand, character does play an accepted role in processes of punish-
ment. For a thoughtful discussion of the distinction between the role of character in
phases of guilt versus phases of punishment, see Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Con-
duct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 99, 99
(1996).
12 See id. ("Although a defendant's character sometimes can function as evidence of
whether the defendant committed the alleged act with a culpable mental state, the defen-
dant's character is not itself a criterion or an element of guilt."); see also G.W.F. HEGEL,
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 123 (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (suggesting that the commission of an act that infringes
on a member of society is necessary and sufficient to justify the state's imposition of crimi-
nal sanction).
13 See WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 57, at 1185.
14 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v.
Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)); see also Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-
Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 165, 197 (2006) (discussing the importance
of the exclusionary rule to combat the risk that judges and jurors will weigh evidence of
past criminal activity too heavily).
[Vol. 97:255
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more likely to convict than a jury without such knowledge. 15 Earlier
experimental research also demonstrated the influence of prior
crimes on the likelihood of guilt judgments. This experimental re-
search suggests that the seriousness and similarity of prior crimes plays
an important role, such that serious crimes or those similar to the
crime on trial are more likely to lead to guiltjudgments than trivial or
dissimilar crimes. 16 In fact, some experiments found no increased
likelihood of guilt judgments when the prior crime is dissimilar to the
current crime. 17 The influence of prior similar crimes on mock-juror
guilt judgments suggests that people make a simple inference about
propensity that operates within a given category. For example, people
might reason along the lines of "once a burglar, always a burglar."'18
But the delimitations of the categories employed in this regard re-
main unsettled in the literature; the relevant category might be as nar-
row as a particular offense, such as burglary, or as broad as a class of
offenses, such as violent crimes. 19 Regardless, the empirical literature
provides fairly robust proof that evidence of a defendant's prior
crimes or character flaws can potentially influence judgments about
whether the defendant committed the specific instance of the specific
crime in question.
To protect against any undue weight that jurors might place on
prior crimes, Congress, state legislatures, and courts have established
certain evidentiary safeguards to limit the admission of evidence re-
15 Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect
of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REv.
1353, 1357, 1380-85 (2009).
16 See Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Deci-
sion Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 69 (1995); Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob,
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235,
237-38 (1976); Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant's Previ-
ous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study, 2000 CRIM. L. REv. 734, 753-55; Roselle L. Wissler &
Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evi-
dence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985).
17 See E. Gil Clary & David R. Shaffer, Another Look at the Impact of Juror Sentiments
Toward Defendants on Juridic Decisions, 125J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 637, 648 (1985). Edmund Howe
suggests that it is similarity and not seriousness that does the work. See Edmund S. Howe,
Judged Likelihood of Different Second Crimes: A Function ofJudged Similarity, 21 J. APPLIED Soc.
PSYCHOL. 697, 697-98 (1991). But the experiment reporting this finding employed a
within-subjects design that posed a very large series of simple propensity questions. It is
therefore likely that the findings of this study are properly limited to what people say ought
to matter, and not how they actually makejudgments. Other studies suggest that there are
two separate effects, one for similarity and one for seriousness. See Wissler & Saks, supra
note 16, at 41-43.
18 See Hans & Doob, supra note 16, 237-38.
19 See A.P. Sealy & W.R. Cornish, L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence,
1973 CRIM. L. REv. 208, 217-18 (explaining that when the prosecution introduced a similar
prior crime, mock juries were more likely to convict; when the prosecution introduced a
dissimilar prior crime the likelihood of conviction did not increase and in fact in some
cases even decreased).
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garding moral character and prior crimes. For example, Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(a) generally prohibits the admission of evidence to
establish that a person has a bad character.2  This rule bars the prose-
cution from presenting evidence that suggests a defendant's general
immoral disposition as a strategy to demonstrate the likelihood that
the defendant committed a specific crime.2 1 Additionally, Rule
404(b) disallows evidence of a defendant's "other crimes, wrongs, or
acts" if used "to prove the character of a person in order to show ac-
tion in conformity therewith."22
Despite the system's best efforts to prevent character-based infer-
ences from affecting judgments of criminal liability, some character
information often will still leak into a trial when it is inextricably inter-
twined with other accepted elements of culpability, such as actus reus
and mens rea, or with various defenses such as duress.23 In fact, Rule
404(b)'s bar against evidence of other crimes does not apply when
introduced to demonstrate "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."24 Con-
sider the fictional example of Smith. In Smith's trial for unlawful gun
possession, evidence that the police also found cocaine and a large
amount of cash in his car might be admissible show Smith's motive for
possessing the gun, that is, to protect himself. Thus, although other
crimes or bad acts are not admissible to prove a defendant's bad char-
acter or propensity to commit the crime in question, 25 sometimes bad
acts or crimes may be admissible to prove that a defendant had a spe-
cial reason to commit the crime in question. In this sense, motive is
sometimes relevant in proving criminal liability for purposes other
than connecting the defendant's bad character to the actions for
which he is on trial.
Motive in this sense comes in many guises because motive might
influence decisions about blame for a variety of reasons. Motive is
most explicitly recognized as relevant in hate crimes, in which the de-
fendant harms a victim because of a protected characteristic of that
20 FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (allowing such evidence only when it is used in specific rebut-
tal to evidence of good character submitted by the defense).
21 See id.
22 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). But see FED. R. EvID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity
evidence in sexual assault cases).
23 However, Oliver Wendell Holmes suggests that the criminal law can more capably
enforce standards of behavior to the extent that we separate liability from inferences of
character derived from motive. See O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 50 (1881)
("[W]hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims more directly than any other
at establishing standards of conduct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to find
that the tests of liability are external, and independent of the degree of evil in the particu-
lar person's motives or intentions.").
24 FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
25 But see FED. R. EVID. 413 (permitting admission of propensity evidence in sexual
assault cases).
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victim, such as disability, gender, or race. 26 Hate crime statutes are
unusual in the sense that they make motive an element of the offense;
that is, motive must be proven in order for liability to attach. 27 In
other cases, motive might be admitted into evidence but is not re-
quired as an element of the offense. In the example of Smith above,
Smith's motive for possessing the gun tends to prove that he did in
fact possess the gun. The fact that Smith had a good reason for carry-
ing the gun (to protect against theft of his cash and drugs) makes less
plausible his claim that, for example, the gun was not his or that he
was not aware that it was in the car. Another example of permissible
(but again, not statutorily required) use of motive is to distinguish
among possible mental states. For example, in a murder trial, evi-
dence that Jones is having an affair with his business partner's wife
might be admissible to show that Jones killed his business partner in-
tentionally rather than recklessly. Motive might also serve as the basis
for avoiding criminal liability. Examples of situations in which motive
might lead to a defense to liability include killing in order to avoid
being killed (i.e., a self-defense justification) or driving through a red
light to rush a dying person to a hospital (i.e., a necessity
justification).28
In this way, the law sometimes permits consideration of a defen-
dant's motive even though it simultaneously forbids considerations of
the defendant's moral character to influence judgments of blame.
But, as our examples illustrate, motive and character are not always
readily distinguishable. The information about Jones's affair may be
admissible for its relevance to his motive and mens rea but this infor-
mation also readily lends itself to unflattering inferences aboutJones's
character as the kind of person who would have an affair with his busi-
ness partner's wife. As a result, the line between specific motive and
general moral character is not always clear.29
26 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.55(a) (West 2009) ("'Hate crime' means a criminal
act committed, in whole or in part, because of one or more of the following actual or
perceived characteristics of the victim: (1) Disability. (2) Gender. (3) Nationality. (4) Race
or ethnicity. (5) Religion. (6) Sexual orientation. (7) Association with a person or group
with one or more of these actual or perceived characteristics.").
27 See, e.g., id.
28 In addition to the issue of the role of motive in determining the defendant's guilt
or innocence, there is a separate question about the role of motive in sentencing. See 1
WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 3.6(b), at 324 (lst ed.
1986); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive's Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 89, 90
& n.1 (2006) (noting that the defendant's motive is traditionally an important factor in
criminal sentencing) (citing Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993)).
29 Scholars debate the role of motive in liability and blame. See, e.g., Guyora Binder,
The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2002) (arguing that the
maxim that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability is false); Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of
Motive in the Criminal Law, 8 Buw. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 673 (2005) (positing that motive
ought to be part of criminal law to track ordinary perceptions of blame); Martin R. Gard-
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The difficulty in distinguishing motive and character also some-
times arises when a defendant unintentionally caused the harm at is-
sue. The definition of recklessness in the Model Penal Code (MPC),
for example, takes into account the "nature and purpose" of the de-
fendant's conduct for the purpose of determining whether the defen-
dant's conduct constituted a "gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situa-
tion. '30 Recklessness in the MPC also involves the disregard of an "un-
justifiable risk,"' 31 which is determined by "considering the nature and
purpose of [the actor's] conduct and the circumstances known to
him."32 The same phrase is also included in the MPC definition of
negligence. 33 The difficulty of distinguishing motive and character is
clear from these definitions since the nature and purpose of the ac-
tor's conduct are, in many situations, inextricably intertwined with the
actor's motive for acting. The defendant who shoots a gun into a
crowd for fun is reckless because the nature and purpose of his con-
duct is unjustifiable; accordingly, the risk he creates is unjustifiable as
well. The defendant who shoots to try to stop a purse snatcher, on the
other hand, has a stronger argument that the risk he took was justi-
fied. In this way, the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct can
be placeholders for motive, and motive can be a strong signal of moral
character.
Motive, in the sense of the nature and purpose of the conduct
that leads to unintended harm, does influence blame judgments as an
empirical matter. Consider Mark D. Alicke's series of experiments,
which suggest that we are more likely to assign blame when a trans-
gressor had a bad motive for doing an act that resulted in harm than
when he had a good motive. 34 In one study, participants read about a
man who was speeding home in the rain and negligently collided with
another car, causing injury.35 Some participants were told that the
man was speeding home because he wanted to hide a vial of cocaine
from his parents; others were told that he was speeding home to hide
an anniversary present for his parents.36 Participants' judgments of
ner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and
Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,737-43 (noting that absence of evil motive is a theoretical
basis for defenses like insanity or duress but not for offense definitions); Hessick, supra
note 28, at 91 (suggesting that motive should play an expanded role in criminal
punishment).
30 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d).
34 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITy & Soc. PSYCHOL. 368,
376-77 (1992).
35 Id. at 369.
36 Id.
[Vol. 97:255
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blame varied systematically with the driver's reason for speeding: peo-
ple who learned that he was speeding home to hide the cocaine
blamed him more than those who learned he was speeding home to
hide the present. 37 Thus, the driver's motivation for speeding influ-
enced lay judgments of blame.3 8 Alicke argues that we are inclined to
blame transgressors with bad motives for acting because it leads to an
inference that they had more control over the situation that led to the
harm-that is, those with "culpable control. '39 More broadly, Alicke's
experimentally proffered reasons for acting come with obvious con-
comitant inferences as to the actor's underlying character-whereas
we would generally make favorable inferences about the character of
the kind of person who is motivated to plan the perfect surprise to
honor his parents' anniversary, we would be prone to make quite op-
posite inferences about the character of a paranoid cocaine
possessor. 40
It is easy to see that admissible information about a defendant's
motive could, in some instances, implicitly encourage inferences
about the defendant's moral character. These inferences are conso-
nant with a theoretical literature on punishment and character that
argues that inferences about moral character ought to be an integral
component of legal blaming processes. 41 On this view, responsibility
for an action derives from the actor's responsibility for his or her own
character. 42 Theorists within this tradition contend that a defendant
should only be culpable for a harmful action insofar as his action sup-
ports an inference of a flawed character or a blameworthy disposition,
that is, if the action "reveals what sort of person he is in some re-
spect. '43 According to this perspective, acts are only blameworthy to
37 Id. at 369-70.
38 Id.
39 See Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL.
556, 558 (2000). It is also possible to engage in motivated nonblaming. For example, in
one Gallup poll, only 18% of people in six Muslim countries believed that Arabs carried
out the attacks of September 11, 2001. See Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the
Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1021-22 (2003).
40 In a subsequent experiment, Alicke tested likability more broadly and found that
an unlikable actor was blamed more for identical harm than a likable actor. See Mark D.
Alicke, Evidential and Extra-Evidential Evaluations of Social Conduct, 9 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PER-
SONALITY 591, 596-601, 603-10 (1994).
41 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSI-
BILITY 119-29 (1970) (positing arguments for this theory); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINK-
ING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.3.2, at 805-06 (1978) (discussing theory that ties moral character to
legal blameworthiness).
42 See FLETCHER, supra note 41.
43 FEINBERG, supra note 41, at 126; see also FLETCHER, supra note 41, § 10.3.1, at 801
("[T]he question [of ajust conclusion of culpability] becomes whether a particular wrong-
ful act is attributable either to the actor's character or to the circumstances that over-
whelmed his capacity for choice.").
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the extent that they betray an underlying character flaw in the actor.44
In this framework, therefore, because claims of duress, necessity, or
accident each derive from situations in which someone of good char-
acter could nevertheless find themselves engaged in a harmful or so-
cially undesirable action,45 excuses and justifications operate to thwart
the inference from action to character and block the attachment of
blame.46
Similarly, a legitimate motive can mitigate or even exculpate a
harmful act. As discussed above, the purpose for which a person im-
poses a risk of harm to others can determine whether or not that per-
son is considered to have acted with the mental state of recklessness or
not.4 7 Just as character theorists tie culpability to an inference of a
flawed character, motive theorists tie culpability to the values ex-
pressed by offenders' motives. On this account, whether we should
mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter depends on our assess-
ment of the worth of the offender's motive for and emotions accom-
panying the killing.48 According to the moral-evaluation conception
of emotion, if an offender's motives and emotions express values we
deem atrocious-for example, a husband's outrage triggered by his
wife's attempt to leave him, or a man's "panic" triggered by an un-
wanted homosexual advance-we will not mitigate, regardless of the
extent to which the defendant's capacity to control his actions was
44 See, e.g., BRANDT, supra note 9, at 475 ("[A]n act is reprehensible (morally admira-
ble) only if it would not have occurred had not its agent had a character in some respect
less (in the case of "admirable," more) desirable than average."); NICOLA LACEY, STATE
PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 68 (1988) ("[It is unfair to
hold people responsible for actions which are out of character, but only fair to hold them
so for actions in which their settled dispositions are centrally expressed."); Bayles, supra
note 9, at 7-15 (1982) (arguing that actions may or may not demonstrate underlying char-
acter traits, but that blame is only appropriate when a socially undesirable trait can be
inferred); George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1673
(1987) ("Whether an action merits praise or blame ... will depend on how it reflects on
the agent, or on something enduring in the agent (which, following tradition, we are call-
ing his 'character.')").
45 Benjamin Sendor points out that there is some corroboration of this conception of
evidence in the commentaries to the MPC. See Sendor, supra note 11, at 100 n.7. For
example, the MPC suggests that "one who kills in response to certain provoking events
should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than
one who kills in their absence." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 5(a) (1985); see also
Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 ARiz. L. REV.
251, 252-53, 271 (1995) ("[E]xcused conduct should include cases in which the agent is
responsible for what she does in the non-moral sense and leave to one side cases in which
the agent is responsible in the moral sense.").
46 See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 383 (1981) ("Excuses show an
act is not to be attributed to a defect of character .
47 See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
48 See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAw OF MURDER AND MAN-
SLAUGHTER 125-26 (1998).
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impaired by his emotion.49 On this account, an evaluation of the ex-
tent to which the actor's motives and emotions were appropriate for
someone in his or her situation determines whether or not liability is
mitigated or even justified or excused.50
Several contemporary theorists oppose the idea that blame de-
rives from character, arguing that blame and punishment ought to be
divorced from inferences about character. 51 Following Alicke's culpa-
ble-control theory, this Article posits that, as a descriptive matter, char-
acter information that is wholly unrelated to the harmful action at
issue can color the way in which fact finders interpret that action. We
hypothesize that people are more inclined to blame (and inclined to
blame more harshly) not only when the actor's reasons for acting are
bad, but more generally, when they have any reason to believe that the
actor is a bad person. We hypothesize that, as an empirical matter, a
bad motive for acting is not necessary for perceivers to make charac-
ter-based inferences about an actor's blame and responsibility.
Rather, any unfavorable character inferences will suffice to motivate
the inculpation of a transgressor. 52
B. Motivated Inculpation
Earlier we raised a core concern expressed by many judges and
legal scholars over the years: namely, that knowledge of a previous
conviction biases the case against the defendant. 53 The intuitions of
Wigmore and of Supreme Court Justices regarding character and
blame are examples of a broader phenomenon that social psycholo-
gists call "motivated reasoning." 54 The general principle is that some-
times we have a preferred conclusion and are so motivated to assume
the veracity of that conclusion that we construe evidence presented to
49 See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 368-72 (1996); see also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASON-
ABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003) (arguing that majority-
culture defendants often successfully rely on dominant social norms like masculinity and
heterosexuality to successfully argue that their violence was partially or fully justified); Vic-
toria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J.
1331, 1332 (1997) (criticizing modern reform in the "crime of passion" defense and con-
cluding that reform "leads to a murder law that is both illiberal and often pervasive.").
50 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 49.
51 See, e.g., Ekow N. Yankah, Good Guys and Bad Guys: Punishing Character, Equality and
the Irrelevance of Moral Character to Criminal Punishment, 25 CARIozo L. REv. 1019, 1027
(2004) (arguing that conclusions about immoral character creates a "permanent criminal
caste").
52 See generally Alicke, supra note 39, at 569-71 (studying how people attribute blame).
53 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
54 See Eileen Braman & Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? Analogi-
cal Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 Am. J. POL. Sc. 940, 941 (2007).
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us in a way that allows us to confirm our initial preference. 55 For ex-
ample, in a study on perceptions of risk, women who read an article
claiming that caffeine posed a risk to women's health were less con-
vinced by the evidence if they themselves were heavy caffeine users
than if they were caffeine abstainers. 56 The women who were heavy
caffeine users had a stake in the results. They were motivated to dis-
count the evidence and so initially preferred a conclusion that allowed
them to go on enjoying their coffee breaks. 57 Women who were light
caffeine users, however, had less reason to discount the evidence and
so generally did not.58
Having a personal stake in the results is just one source of motiva-
tion; there are many ways in which serving our own interests can drive
the conclusions we endorse. 59 For example, we are also motivated to
construe information in ways that confirm previously held biases or
preconceived notions. Judges may misremember the facts of the case
before them in ways that support subconsciously endorsed racial ste-
reotypes. 60 Jurors sometimes engage in motivated evaluation of evi-
dence by disregarding and failing to discuss evidence that supports
the conclusion opposite to the one they already favor.61
A prime example of motivated reasoning in law lies in policy-bi-
ased judging. Judges profess to decide cases neutrally; some even pro-
55 See, e.g., Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential Deci-
sion Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 568,
581-82 (1992); Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 541-42 (2004); Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., The Motivated Use
of Moral Principles, 4JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 476, 489 (2009).
56 The study found no such difference for men. See Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference:
Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYcHOL.
636, 646 (1987).
57 See id. at 644.
58 See id.
59 See Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REv. 1337, 1342 (1995) [hereinafter Babcock et al., BiasedJudgments]; Linda Babcock et al.,
Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 913, 915 (1997)
[hereinafter Babcock et al., Creating Convergence]; Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein,
Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, I IJ. ECON. PERSP. 109, 110
(1997).
60 Cf Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84
NoTRE DAME L. Rv. 1195 (2009) (determining that sometimes judges hold implicit racial
biases that affect decision making).
61 See Kurt A. Carlson &J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock Jurors,
7J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 91-92 (2001). Similarly, the good or bad motive
of the defendant can influence the extent to which mock jurors credit various pieces of
evidence in the trial. See Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision
Making y Constraint Satisfaction, 128J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3, 11-12 (1999) (us-
ing a vignette involving a libel action by a company against an investor, the researchers
demonstrated that, compared to when the investor was motivated simply by honest con-
cern, when his speech was motivated by malicious greed, perceivers were more likely to
positively assess arguments supporting liability, and to negatively assess arguments under-
mining liability).
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fess that their role is like an umpire calling balls and strikes. 62 Very
few judges would acknowledge that they decide cases according to
their own policy preferences. Nevertheless, a wealth of evidence from
real cases demonstrates that judges sometimes decide cases according
to their personal political ideology63-even though they are generally
unaware that they are doing so. 64 Moreover, even judges who under-
stand that they must disregard information that is excluded from evi-
dence, and genuinely attempt to ignore it, still remain on the whole
unable to refrain from being influenced by the barred information. 65
Of course, these ideas apply outside the judiciary as well. In one
study, people predisposed to favor a policy permitting gay scout lead-
ers judged other cases to be more similar if they involved a finding of
illegal discrimination. 66 In another study, law students deciding the
constitutionality of a proposed change in a school district's tax rate
were more likely to find the proposed tax rate unconstitutional when
it was inconsistent with their own tax policy preferences. 67 This find-
ing emerged even though the participants were provided with a mone-
tary incentive to arrive at the legally correct decision. 68
When we make a decision, we often have several goals, even if we
are not consciously aware of them. We generally want to reach the
62 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to be ChiefJustice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States).
63 See EILEEN BRAMAN, LAw, POLITICS, & PERCEPTION: How POLICY PREFERENCES INFLU-
ENCE LEGAL REASONING 4-5 (2009); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTI-
TUDES AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946-1963, at 102 (1965); JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 69 (1993)
(asserting that judges' prior ideological preferences strongly influence case outcomes);
Eileen Braman, Reasoning on the Threshold: Testing the Separability of Preferences in Legal Deci-
sion Making, 68J. POL. 308, 318-19 (2006) (concluding that decisions about standing in a
free speech case about abortion are influenced both by free speech attitudes and abortion
attitudes); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making,
86 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 323, 325 (1992); Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of
Lawryers' Socio-Political Attitudes on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 43-48 (1999) (finding that judges' personal support for the death
penalty influences decisions about whether particular social science evidence is admissible
under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
64 See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, The Halo Effect: Evidence for Un-
conscious Alteration of Judgments, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 250, 254-56 (1977).
65 See AndrewJ. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1258-59 (2005). On the other hand,
judges' probable cause decisions appear to be remarkably uninfluenced by the hindsight
bias. SeeJeffreyJ. Rachlinski et al., Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight 1-5 (Vand. Pub.
L. Research Paper No. 11-25, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877125.
66 See Braman & Nelson, supra note 54, at 949.
67 See Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law's Policy Implications Affect Beliefs About Its
Constitutionality? An Experimental Test, 32 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 221-26 (2008) (noting
that a law professor and a federal judge independently arrived at what the study deter-
mined to be the correct ruling).
68 See id. at 221.
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conclusion that is best supported by the available evidence. At the
same time, however, other goals bias how we interpret and process
this evidence before we reach the conclusion. Sometimes we have ini-
tial intuitions or hypotheses driven by our preexisting preferences. 69
We then tend to reject some evidence and accept other evidence in a
biased fashion consistent with our preferences. 70 That is, we evaluate
evidence according to what we already believe,71 and we selectively
remember some things but not others.72 We are also influenced by
factors that we ourselves regard as unjustifiable, though we may not be
aware of such influence. 73 This is especially true when the legitimate
evidence is "elastic"-that is, when there is more wiggle room to come
out either way in the conclusion.7 4 And, when we finally allow our-
selves to reach the conclusion we preferred from the beginning, we
convince ourselves that we chose it because of the evidence and not
because of any other goals we have.75 In sum, as Jon Hanson and
David Yosifon instruct, "The first lesson of motivated reasoning,
whatever its manifestation, is that we humans tend to hold beliefs and
reach judgments and conclusions that we desire, and we vastly under-
appreciate that tendency-particularly in ourselves. ' 76
Moreover, we are especially prone to engage in motivated reason-
ing when we hold strong opinions on a complex issue. 77 Under these
circumstances, we examine relevant evidence in a biased manner, ac-
cepting favorable evidence at face value while critically evaluating and
discounting unfavorable evidence. 78 Sometimes we hold strong opin-
ions about judgments involving justice-for example, we read about a
heinous crime in the newspaper and feel strongly that the criminal
69 See Kunda, supra note 56, at 646.
70 See Peter H. Ditto et al., Motivated Sensitivity to Preference-Inconsistent Information, 75J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 54, 64-67 (1998).
71 See Babcock et al., Biased Judgments, supra note 59, at 1339-42; Dan Simon et al., The
Emergence of Coherence over the Course of Decision Making, 27J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARN-
ING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1250, 1257 (2001).
72 See William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda, Maintaining Self-Serving Social Comparisons: Biased
Reconstruction of One's Past Behaviors, 19 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 732, 737
(1993).
73 See Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification: How Unjustifiable Factors Influence Judg-
ments, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 122, 122-23, 128 (1996).
74 See id. at 123-24.
75 See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 482-83
(1990); Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motiva-
tional Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model, 20 ADVANCES IN EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 319-23 (1987).
76 Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Charac-
ter, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 138 (2003).
77 See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 2098,
2098 (1979).
78 See id.
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ought to be harshly punished. In our own day-to-day lives, our beliefs
about justice and our motivations to seek just outcomes can influence
what we remember.79 We may even adjust memories of past events to
maintain a belief that people get what they deserve. 0 In one study,
for example, people asked to recall the value of a lottery prize
remembered a smaller amount awarded when the winner was a bad
person than when the winner was a good person.81 Indeed, biased
recall can also extend to memories about our own prior exper-
iences.8 2 For example, people who received a lucky break (such as a
prize awarded by random numbers) were able to later recall more
good deeds from their own past than those who had not been lucky.8 3
Analogously, when we are prompted to think of ourselves as a bad
person, we tend to think that we had it coming if fate then deals us a
bad hand. For example, people who were asked to recall bad deeds
from their past were more accepting of their fate later when they were
forced to spend twenty-five minutes on a mind-numbing task, com-
pared to people who recalled bad deeds of other people.8 4 These
studies suggest that we naturally inflate or devalue our conception of
our own selves to see our fate as just and fair.
So how does the phenomenon of motivated reasoning relate to
judgments of criminal liability? We contend in this Article that people
harbor a generalized social preference to inculpate people with bad
characters.8 5 In understanding this initial preference, it is useful to
79 Motivations to seek justice can also influence subsequent behavior, even in unre-
lated domains. See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in
MORAL JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 101-24 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 2009) (con-
cluding that a mismatch between law and community attitudes can result in a behavioral
backlash); Elizabeth Mullen & Janice Nadler, Moral Spillovers: The Effect of Moral Violations
on Deviant Behavior, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1239, 1244-45 (2008) (discussing
how perceived moral violations can cause moral spillovers, increasing subsequent deviant
behavior); Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1426-29 (2005) (finding
that perceived injustice in legislation and judicial decisions can lead to lower levels of eve-
ryday legal compliance).
80 See Mitchell J. Callan et al., The Effects of Justice Motivation on Memory for Self- and
Other-Relevant Events, 45J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 614, 615 (2009); see also Babcock et
al., Creating Convergence, supra note 59, at 916 (discussing "hindsight bias").
81 See Callan et al., supra note 80, at 616.
82 See Klein & Kunda, supra note 72, at 737-38.
83 See Callan et al., supra note 80, at 619. Conversely, those who had not received the
lucky break were able to recall more bad deeds from their past than those who had re-
ceived the lucky break. See id.
84 See id. at 619-20.
85 A related claim is that, in assessing blameworthiness, we tend to infer personality
trais from behavior. Thus, we reason, if Smith injured Jones, it must be because Smith is a
bad person. At the same time, we tend to ignore or give insufficient weight to situational
pressures that might have led Smith to injure Jones. Donald Dripps calls this the "funda-
mental retribution error." See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Jus-
tice and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1426 (2003). Our focus in this
Article is different: we examine the influence of information about character that is sepa-
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consider ltmile Durkheim's account of the social function of crime
and punishment. According to Durkheim, attaching blame for a
crime performs a necessary expressive social function because it allows
members of society to affirm and protect collective values.8 6 In pun-
ishing, says Durkheim, "we are avenging . . . the outrage to moral-
ity."'8 7  And by blaming and punishing, we are effectively
differentiating ourselves from members of the society who are not ap-
propriately conforming to societal expectations, thus symbolically sep-
arating the "bad" members of society from the "good" members of
society.88 As a result, the inculpation of the wicked serves simultane-
ously as an expression of the solidarity of honest citizens and a reaffir-
mation of the values and expectations of the collectivity.
Durkheim's theory of punishment as a social tool ultimately sug-
gests that we are naturally driven to inculpate and punish individuals
we believe do not properly embrace and conform to our collective
moral code.8 9 This further suggests that when we are confronted with
the complex task of assigning blame for an allegedly criminal action
within a formal legal proceeding, we will be motivated to construe the
information before us in a way that best allows us to reach our desired
conclusion and punish a bad person. This then leads to the hypothe-
sis at the heart of the phenomenon that we call motivated inculpation:
if we have any reason to infer that a defendant has a bad moral charac-
ter, we will be more likely to construe that defendant's action as crimi-
nally culpable. Moreover, although formal legal processes try to
suppress character-based judgments by focusing our blaming atten-
tion on discrete elements of the crime at issue, the research on moti-
vated reasoning suggests that our initial preference to blame bad
actors would likely color the way in which we interpret those elements
of the crime. Thus, we hypothesize that when a fact finder judges a
harmful action performed by a "bad" defendant or performed with a
bad motive, the defendant is perceived as more responsible, and the
act as more causal and intentional, than when a fact finder judges an
identical harmful action conducted by a "good" defendant or with a
good motive.
rate from the act itself, including reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2) or even infor-
mation about character that is independent of the act (Experiment 3).
86 See DURKHEIM, supra note 4, at 34, 61-63.
87 Id. at 47.
88 See id. at 31-67.
89 See id.
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II
EXPERIMENTS: MORAL CHARACTER AND BLAME
In the experiments we conducted for this Article, we tested the
idea that people's judgments about the underlying elements of crimi-
nal liability can be colored by initial inferences about the transgres-
sor's moral character as derived from information about the
defendant's motive for acting or from character information that is
wholly unrelated to the harmful act at issue. Thus, we explore the
notion that, just as judges may decide some cases according to their
own policy preferences, ordinary people can be motivated to blame a
transgressor on the basis of perceived moral character.
In the experiments presented here, we focus on situations in
which the causal contribution of a transgressor's act is tenuous and in
which mens rea is weak or absent. By minimizing intentionality and
causality, we are better able to observe the role of perceived moral
character in blame attributions. We hypothesize that the perceived
moral character of a transgressor will influence judgments not only of
blame and responsibility but also of mens rea and causality. That is,
when observers perceive someone as a bad person, they will not only
be more likely to blame that person for any act that results in harm,
but they will also be more likely to judge the act as more causal and
the mental state as more culpable. Below, we summarize the results of
three experiments we conducted to test the role of information re-
garding moral character in blame attributions for criminal offenses.
Then we briefly discuss some of the implications of our findings for
the criminal-law doctrines of felony murder, inchoate offense, causa-
tion, and the evidentiary admissibility of character evidence.
A. Experiment 1: Frank Brady and the Firefighters
We conducted this preliminary experiment to test the hypothesis
that for a bad outcome, bad moral character influences perceptions of
blame, responsibility, causation, and the like, holding constant mens
rea and actus reus. We recruited a group of adults to answer an on-
line questionnaire in. which we presented a brief vignette loosely
based on People v. Brady.90 In that case, the defendant was found crim-
inally liable for the death of two firefighters after a trailer, which he
used as a methamphetamine lab, exploded. In the vignette, we varied
the contents of the trailer (methamphetamines or highly flammable
fertilizer) in order to examine the effect of the defendant's perceived
character on participants' subsequent judgments of blame and
responsibility.
90 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 286 (Ct. App. 2005).
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1. Participants
We recruited 205 participants through Amazon's Mechanical
Turk web service, which allows assignment of simple tasks to a large
population of users online. 91 We paid participants fifty cents for com-
pleting the survey, which took about five minutes, and assured them
that their responses would remain anonymous and that we would not
collect identifying information. We excluded seventeen participants
because of missing data. Of the remaining 188, 63% were female,
with a mean age of about thirty-seven years. Seventy-nine percent
identified themselves as White, 6% as Black, 5% as Hispanic, 5% as
Asian Pacific, 2% as South Asian, and 3% as Other. Fifteen percent
were full-time students, and 8% were part-time students. Seventy per-
cent were college educated. Ninety-five percent had lived in the
United States for at least twelve years. For 56% of the sample, their
household income was less than $50,000 per year. Politically, 48%
identified themselves as liberal or very liberal; 28% identified as mod-
erate, and 25% identified as conservative or very conservative.
2. Design and Materials
We randomly divided participants into two groups. One group
read the "Orchids" version, and one group read the "Meth" version of
the vignette reproduced below:
Frank Brady lost control of a campfire that he had built on his prop-
erty and it spread to a trailer he kept on the premises. He used the
trailer
[Orchids:] to store highly flammable fertilizers to care for his
collection of exotic plants in his orchid greenhouse.
[Meth:] as a methamphetamine laboratory where he used
highly flammable chemicals to make illegal drugs.
When the fire made contact with the [fertilizers]/[chemicals] in
the trailer, it caused a huge explosion and raged out of control.
Four firefighter-pilots in helicopters and air tankers were called in
to try and put the fire out by dousing it from overhead. During the
sixth trip up to douse the fire, one of the pilots approached from
the wrong direction and collided with another helicopter. Two pi-
lots were killed in the collision.
Each participant read either the Orchids or the Meth version of
the vignette, but not both. After reading the vignette, we asked par-
ticipants to provide their own opinion about Frank Brady and his role
in the death of the two pilots: to what extent he is responsible; how
negatively he should be judged; how much he is to blame; to what
extent he caused the deaths; how intentional were his actions; how
91 See AMAZON MECHANICAL TuRK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last vis-
ited Oct. 24, 2011).
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foreseeable the deaths were from Brady's perspective; the extent to
which he was careless; and how likeable he is. We measured all ques-
tions on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). We
randomized the order of these questions.
After evaluating Frank Brady, we asked participants to think
about the pilot who flew in the wrong direction. We asked partici-
pants their personal opinions about the pilot's role in the collision: to
what extent he was responsible; how negatively he should be judged;
how much he is to blame; and the extent to which he caused the colli-
sion. We measured all questions on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (very much). Again, the order of presentation of these questions
was random.
3. Results92
a. Judgments of Frank Brady
Compared to participants in the Orchids condition, participants
in the Meth condition judged Brady to be more responsible, 93 blame-
worthy,94 and worthy of negative judgment 95 for the death of the two
pilots. This is illustrated in Figure 1. In addition to ultimate judg-
ments about blame and responsibility, other, more basic perceptions
varied according to the contents of the trailer. Despite the fact that all
participants learned that the fertilizer or drugs were "highly flamma-
ble," the participants in the Meth condition perceived Brady's actions
to be more of a cause of the pilots' deaths than participants in the
Orchids condition.96 This is also illustrated in Figure 1.
92 All analyses in this Article were conducted using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
unless otherwise noted. An ANOVA measures for statistical differences between the means
of groups whose data are categorical (as opposed to continuous). See WILLIAM L. HAys,
STATISTICS 376-81 (5th ed. 1994). F is a ratio that measures mean differences relative to
variability within the sample. See id. at 360. Throughout this Article, "significantly" refers
to statistical significance, which denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis-the
possibility of no differences between the various groups-at a probability level indicated by
the p-value reported. Thus, p is defined as the probability of finding a difference or
relationship between two groups as large as that observed if there were, in fact, no
difference or relationship between them. See id. at 267-82.
93 F(1, 185) = 66.97, p < .001, qp2 = .266. Partial eta-squared (q) is a measure of the
percent of total variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the independent
variable, analogous to R2 in regression analysis. Interpretation is as follows: .01 small; .06
medium; .14 large.
94 F(1, 186) = 68.66, p < .001, qP2 = .270.
95 F(1, 185) = 127.43, p < .001, 17P = .408.
96 F(1, 186) = 55.32, p < .001, q 2 = .229.
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FIGURE 1.
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN RATINGS OF FRANK BRADY'S ROLE IN THE DEATH
OF THE Two PILOTS, BY MORAL CHARACTER CONDITION
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Responsible Negatively Judge Blame Cause
Orchids [ Meth
Figure 2 illustrates participants' perceptions of Brady's mental
state, indicating his perceived control over of the harm. When com-
pared to participants in the Orchids condition, participants in the
Meth condition perceived Brady to be acting more intentionally97 and
carelessly9" in losing control of the campfire. Participants in the Meth
condition also perceived the deaths of the pilots to be more foresee-
able.99 Not surprisingly, participants assigned to the Meth group also
perceived Brady as less likeable than participants assigned to the
Orchids group. 100
97 F(1, 186) = 25.77, p < .001, qp2 = .122.
98 (1, 183) = 7.67, p < .01, r17 = .040.
99 F(1, 184) = 5.56, p < .05, 17,2 = .029.
100 F(1, 184) = 125.08, p < .01, rqp2 = .405. Meth (M = 1.84); Orchids (M = 3.65).
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EXPERIMENT 1:
THE DEATH OF
r- l
FIGURE 2.
MEAN RATINGS OF FRANK BRADY'S MENTAL STATE IN
THE Two PILOTS, BY MORAL CHARACTER CONDITION
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
[I JMOrchids L Meth]
b. Judgments of the Pilot in Error
After rating their perceptions of Frank Brady, we asked partici-
pants to think about the pilot who flew the wrong way. Interestingly,
participants' judgments of the pilot were the mirror image of their
judgments of Brady, such that in the Meth condition they judged the
pilot less harshly than in the Orchids condition.10 1 Figure 3 illustrates
mean ratings.
101 Pilot responsible: F(1, 183) = 13.78, p < .01, rip' = .070; Pilot negatively judged:
111, 186) = 23.28, p < .01, ,p = .111; Pilot to blame: R(1, 186) = 19.06, p < .01, qr = .093;
Pilot the cause: F(, 186) = 13.59, p < .01, q2 = .068.
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FIGuRE 3.
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN RATINGS OF THE PILOT WHO FLEW THE WRONG
WAY, By FRANK BRADY'S MORAL CHARACTER
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Responsible NegativelyJudge Blame Cause
I ME Orchids E Meth
The reversed pattern in judgments of the pilot's responsibility
suggests that participants' perceptions followed a rule of conservation
of responsibility, in which attributing high responsibility to Brady im-
plies attributing lower responsibility to the pilot in error and vice
versa. To illustrate this, we constructed single measures of perceived
responsibility for both Brady and for the pilot. Judgments regarding
Brady's responsibility, negative judgment, blame, and share of causa-
tion were highly correlated 0 2 as were those regarding the pilot.'0 3
Using the mean of these scores for Brady and the pilot, respectively,
we constructed a single measure of Brady's responsibility and a single
measure of pilot responsibility. Participants in the Meth condition
seemed to perceive reduced responsibility for the pilot who flew the
wrong way compared to participants in the Orchid condition. This is
illustrated in Figure 4.
102 Cronbach's alpha = .95. Cronbach's alpha measures the internal consistency of a
set of items, and ranges between 0 and 1, with higher numbers indicating higher consis-
tency. See RicK H. HOYLE ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN SocIAL RELATIONS 83-84 (7th ed.
2002).
103 Cronbach's alpha = .90.
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FIGuRE 4.
EXPERIMENT 1: MEAN PERCEIVED RELATIVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
CRASH OF FRANK AND OF THE PILOT WHO FLEW THE WRONG WAY,
BY MORAL CHARACTER CONDITION.
j. ..1 Pl-,43
Pilot, 5.23
Frank, 3.43
Orchids Meth
4. Discussion
Experiment 1 demonstrates that, even holding constant the sever-
ity of the harm and the transgressor's mental state, participants' judg-
ments about the controllability of the harm and the transgressor's
responsibility-as well as the responsibility of other parties involved-
vary extensively depending on the perceived moral character of the
transgressor. In the Meth version of the vignette-where Frank Brady
stored flammable chemicals to make methamphetamine-study par-
ticipants perceived him as an unlikeable guy doing bad things even
though the fire started with an innocent campfire. Compared to the
Orchid vignette in which Brady stored "innocent" orchid fertilizer,
participants attributed the consequences that followed from the ac-
tions of the "bad" Brady as more blameworthy as well as more inten-
tional, causal, and foreseeable. Seemingly, a campfire accidentally
started by a "bad" person has more causal power and gives rise to
more negative attributions than a campfire accidentally started by a
"regular" person.
It must be noted, however, that the differences in foreseeability
ratings give rise to a possible alternate explanation for the results.
Even though we gave both the chemicals for manufacturing the
methamphetamine and the chemical fertilizers identical descriptions
of dangerousness-namely, "highly flammable"-it might be that par-
ticipants perceived the methamphetamine chemicals to be more flam-
mable or more dangerous than the fertilizer. Moreover, it might be
20121
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that participants judged Brady as more likely to anticipate a fire occur-
ring with chemicals for methamphetamine than with chemicals for
greenhouse fertilizer. After all, the process of methamphetamine
manufacture has a general reputation for dangerousness; greenhouse
fertilizers generally do not. To rule out this explanation, we con-
ducted a separate experiment (Experiment 2) also involving the stor-
age of flammable materials in which we hold constant the material
stored.
Another question that arises about the results of this experiment
is whether we successfully varied moral character. It stands to reason
that participants will perceive a person who manufactures an illegal
and dangerous drug like methamphetamine as having a worse moral
character than a person who engages in greenhouse gardening. In-
deed, the difference in the likeability ratings in the two versions of the
story we reported earlier confirms this notion. In Experiment 2, we
included additional measures designed to more directly measure the
perceived moral character of the transgressor.
Finally, this experiment leaves a question about whether the ob-
served trend in attributing more blame and controllability to a person
with bad moral character also extends to attributing less blame and
controllability to a person with good (as opposed to neutral) moral
character. To address this, in the next experiment we include three
versions of moral character: bad, neutral, and good.
B. Experiment 2: Sam Norton and the Youths
1. Participants
We recruited 195 participants through Amazon's Mechanical
Turk web service. We paid participants fifty cents for completing the
survey, which took less than five minutes, and assured them that their
responses would remain anonymous and that we would not collect
identifying information. Demographic characteristics were similar to
the sample in Experiment 1.
2. Design and Materials
We randomly divided participants into three groups. One group
read the "Daughter" (good character) version, one group read the
"Business" (neutral character) version, and one group read the
"Cheating Coach" (bad character) version of the vignette reproduced
below:
Sam Norton used his backyard shed to store oxygen tanks. He knew
the tanks posed a fire hazard, but he stored them there because
[Daughter:] his young daughter has serious respiratory disease,
and he provides around the clock care for her.
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[Business:] he has just started his own business providing in-
home delivery of healthcare equipment.
[Cheating Coach:] he is a high school football coach and ad-
ministers oxygen to his players even though it provides an un-
fair advantage and is against the rules.
One night, some neighborhood youths were smoking cigarettes be-
hind Sam Norton's shed. One of them tossed a lit cigarette butt on
the ground near the shed. Some dry leaves ignited, and soon after,
the oxygen tanks in the shed exploded. One of the youths was
killed in the explosion.
Each participant read only one version of the vignette. After
reading the vignette, we asked participants to provide their own opin-
ion about Sam Norton and his role in the death of the youth. The
measures were the same as those in Experiment 1 and appeared in
random order with the following exception. To check whether we
successfully manipulated perceived moral character, we asked to what
extent Norton has a good moral character (1 = not at all; 7 = very
much), is trustworthy (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), and is a bad or
good person (1 = bad person; 4 = not sure; 7 = good person). We
asked these questions about moral character last so as not to alert par-
ticipants to the hypothesis of interest beforehand.
3. Results
As expected, participants judged the Sam Norton who cares for
his sick daughter as more moral in character, 10 4 more trustworthy,10 5
and more of a good person10 6 than Norton the businessman, and
judged Norton the businessman more favorably than the Norton who
cheats at football.' 0 7
Participants' judgments of the extent to which Sam Norton is re-
sponsible,1 0 8 blameworthy,1 0 9 and worthy of negative judgment 1 0 for
the death of the youth differed significantly across moral character
condition, as did his perceived causal role. l i t The differences are in
the direction expected, with the Norton who takes care of his daugh-
104 K2, 192) = 38.60, p < .001, rqp2 = .287. Daughter (M= 4.98); Business (M = 4.23);
Cheating (M = 3.11).
105 F(2, 192) = 37.98, p < .001, qr' = .283. Daughter (M = 4.68); Business (M = 3.78);
Cheating (M = 2.81).
106 F(2, 191) = 30.05, p < .001, rjp2 = .239. Daughter (M = 4.90); Business (M = 4.17);
Cheating (M = 3.52).
107 As described above, as a manipulation check, we asked three questions to gauge
the perceived moral character of Sam Norton. We asked these questions last after all the
measures reported here. See supra Part II.B.2.
108 F(2, 192) = 13.12, p < .001, y7 = .120.
109 F(2, 191) = 18.63, p < .001, r72 = .163.
110 F(2, 192) = 21.47, p < .001, rIp2 = .183.
M11 F(2, 191) = 12.84, p < .001, r/' = .119.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ter as the least blameworthy and causal, and the Norton who cheats at
football the most blameworthy and causal, as illustrated in Figure 5.
FIGURE 5.
EXPERIMENT 2: MEAN RATINGS OF SAM NORTON'S ROLE IN THE DEATH
OF THE YOUTH, BY MORAL CHARACTER CONDITION
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Responsible NegativelyJudge Blame Cause
Daughter = Business E Cheating
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 6, moral character also influ-
enced participants' perceptions of intentionality, with good character
(Daughter) leading to perceptions of lesser intentionality, but no dif-
ferences between neutral (Business) and bad character (Cheating). 112
As to foreseeability, we found no statistically significant influence of
moral character. 13
112 F(2, 192) = 4.40, p < .05, r/2 = .044.
113 F(2, 191) = 0.62, p = .54.
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FIGURE 6.
EXPERIMENT 2: MEAN RATINGS OF SAM NORTON'S MENTAL STATE IN
THE DEATH OF THE YOUTH, BY MORAL CHARACTER CONDITION
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Intentionality Foreseeability
Daughter = Business F Cheating
4. Discussion
In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of the first experiment,
while providing more reliable controls for the dangerousness of the
act and more directly measuring perceived moral character. As in Ex-
periment 1, we again found that participants perceive a transgressor
with a bad moral character as more blameworthy. Additionally, we
found that a transgressor with a good moral character (as opposed to
a neutral moral character) is less blameworthy, so that when com-
pared to the neutral midpoint, the moral character effect extends in
both negative and positive directions. We also again demonstrated
that bad moral character gives rise to attributions of controllability, as
shown by the effect on perceived causation. It is noteworthy that bad
moral character had no observed effect on intent; at the same time,
good moral character led participants to perceive the transgressor as
having acted less intentionally compared to the control condition.
In demonstrating the role of moral character in the first two ex-
periments, however, we did not separate moral character from the na-
ture and purpose of the conduct that led to harm. That is to say, in
the bad moral character Meth condition of Experiment 1, the partici-
pants' inference about Brady's character arose from his motive or pur-
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pose for storing the risky, flammable materials; the same was true for
the good moral character Orchid condition. Notably, the law's toler-
ance for risk taking like Brady's-or Norton's in Experiment 2-
sometimes takes into account motive- or purpose-based welfare con-
siderations. This is particularly evident in the MPC's definition of
recklessness and of negligence, both of which account for the nature
and purpose of the risky conduct.1 14 Specifically, when an individual
disregards a substantial risk and the nature and purpose of that disre-
gard is not legitimate, that individual may be criminally liable.' 1 5 On
the other hand, when an individual disregards a substantial risk but is
motivated in that disregard by a laudatory purpose, the law might rec-
ognize both the nature of the risk and its disregard as legitimate and
thus, as insufficient to form the basis of criminal liability.1 16 In Experi-
ment 1, growing orchids arguably increases social welfare; manufac-
turing methamphetamine does not. In Experiment 2, the same can
be said of caring for a sick daughter and cheating at football, respec-
tively. To begin to try to isolate the influence of social welfare consid-
erations, we attempted in the next experiment to separate moral
character from the nature and purpose of the conduct that led to the
harm.
C. Experiment 3: Sara Davidson and the Dogs
The previous experiments varied perceived moral character by
manipulating the actor's purpose for creating the hazardous condi-
tion. In Experiment 3, we sought to make the source of moral charac-
ter more remote from the hazardous condition that the actor created.
Additionally, we tested a second independent variable along with
moral character by varying the transgressor's awareness of the likeli-
hood of harm. We hypothesized participants would perceive offend-
ers who were aware of and disregarded a risk of harm as more
responsible and blameworthy than offenders who were not aware of
risk-this prediction follows directly from criminal-law theory.1 17 We
also predicted that bad moral character can serve as a kind of proxy
for awareness of risk, so that even when there is reason to believe a
transgressor was unaware of a risk, participants would still blame her
just as if she were aware of the risk if they perceive her to be a gener-
ally bad person.
114 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(c), (d) (1985).
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
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1. Participants
We recruited 203 participants through Amazon's Mechanical
Turk web service. We paid participants one dollar for completing the
survey, which took about five minutes to complete, and assured them
that their responses would remain anonymous and that we would not
collect identifying information. We excluded a number of respon-
dents who failed to correctly respond to an instructional manipulation
check, 18 leaving a final sample size of 182 participants. Demographic
characteristics were similar to the sample in Experiment 1.
2. Design and Materials
We randomly divided participants into four groups. We indepen-
dently varied two factors: first, moral character (Bad; Good) and sec-
ond, mental state (Aware; Unaware). Each participant read one
version of the vignette reproduced below:
[Good Character:] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives
in a house with her two dogs. Sara has two young nieces whom she
adores and sees often. She spoils them with birthday presents and
special outings. Sara spends much of her free time volunteering for
various local charities. She tries to maintain a healthy lifestyle by
eating well and exercising. She has many close friends and an active
social life.
[Bad Character:] Sara Davidson is a 39 year old woman who lives in
a house with her two dogs. Sara has two young nieces but she rarely
sees them, and does not really like to spend time with them. She
spends much of her free time watching trash-tv talk shows while
smoking and eating junk food, even though she is aware that it's not
good for her blood sugar problem. She doesn't socialize much and
prefers to keep to herself.
[Aware/Unaware:] Sara's dogs are not well behaved [and she is]/
[but she is not really] aware of this. They are in a fenced yard, but
they sometimes escape and roam the neighborhood. On one occa-
sion the dogs escaped and cornered two children, barking and
growling. The children were unable to escape until a neighbor ran
outside with a baseball bat and chased the dogs away. Even when
fenced in the yard, the dogs growl and act aggressively toward peo-
ple walking on the sidewalk.
One morning while Sara was asleep, her dogs escaped and ter-
rorized a neighbor who had just opened his garage door to leave for
work. They circled the man's truck and the man jumped in the
118 See Daniel M. Oppenheimer et al., Instructional Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisfic-
ing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPELIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 867, 867-68 (2009). In
our experiment, we asked respondents, "According to the story, to what extent did Sara
Davidson realize that her dogs were not well behaved?" We then asked them to choose one
of two options: "Sara was NOT really aware of this" or "Sara was aware of this."
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truck to escape. His wife heard the yelling and chased them off by
startling them with the noise of the automatic garage door.
A few minutes later, two brothers, Chris and Travis, aged 8 and
11, were waiting at a school bus stop when they saw the dogs coming
at them. They panicked and climbed up a tree; the dogs circled the
tree, barking wildly. The dogs eventually headed down a ravine,
and Chris climbed down to check and see where they were. The
dogs circled back toward him and chased him. Just as the school
bus approached, the dogs caught Chris and began mauling him,
within view of the bus driver and the children. The driver called
911 but it was too late-Chris died from his injuries within minutes.
After reading the vignette, we asked participants to provide their
own opinion about Davidson and her role in the death of the child.
Specifically, we asked the following questions: To what extent is Sara
Davidson responsible for the death of the boy? How negatively should
Sara Davidson be judged for the death of the boy? How much blame
goes to Sara Davidson for the death of the boy? To what extent did
Sara Davidson cause the death of the boy? How intentional was Sara
Davidson toward the death of the boy? From the perspective of some-
one in Sara Davidson's position, how foreseeable was the death of the
boy? We randomized the presentation of these questions and mea-
sured them on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
To check whether we successfully manipulated perceived moral
character, we asked at the end of the questionnaire to what extent
Davidson has a good moral character (1 = not at all; 7 = very much), is
trustworthy (1 = not at all; 7= very much), and is a bad or good person
(1 = bad person; 4 = not sure; 7 = good person). We varied the order
of these questions randomly.
3. Results
Responses to the three questions just described, which we used to
check whether we successfully manipulated Davidson's perceived
moral character, were all highly correlated, so we combined these
three items into a single measure of moral character (1 = not at all;
7 = very much). 119 As expected, participants' perceptions of David-
son's moral character depended on whether participants read the
Good Character condition (in which Davidson was sociable, generous,
and healthy) or the Bad Character condition (in which Davidson was
unsociable and unhealthy). 120 This provides evidence that we success-
fully manipulated perceived moral character.1 21
119 Cronbach's alpha = .92.
120 F(1, 181) = 152.01, p< .001, r/P2 = .458; Good Character (M= 4.40); Bad Character
(M = 2.61).
121 Note that we manipulated moral character, in part, by manipulating the food and
exercise choices of the target person (Sara Davidson). There is some empirical evidence
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As mentioned previously, we manipulated both moral character
and awareness of the risk of harm in this experiment. We first ex-
amined the effect of moral character and of awareness on partici-
pants' judgments of the extent to which Davidson is responsible for
the boy's death, is worthy of negative judgment for the boy's death,
and is blameworthy for the boy's death. Participants' responses were
highly correlated, so we combined them into a single measure of over-
all responsibility.1 22 Figure 7 illustrates the means. Specifically, par-
ticipants perceived Davidson as having more overall responsibility for
the boy's death if her character was bad than if it was good,123 and also
possibly if she was aware of the risk of harm than if she was una-
ware.124 As is also apparent from Figure 7, participants treated David-
son in the Unaware condition as if she was aware of the risk when they
also learned that her character is bad, but assigned her noticeably less
overall responsibility if they also learned that her character is good.
Additionally, participants' judgments of causation varied accord-
ing to Davidson's awareness of risk 125 and possibly also according to
her moral character,126 as illustrated in Figure 8. Specifically, aware-
ness of risk played a clear role in participants' judgments of causation;
in addition, participants perceived Davidson in the Unaware condi-
tion to have a lessened causal role if her moral character was good.
We also asked participants about the extent to which the boy's
death was intentional and the extent to which it was foreseeable. Par-
ticipants perceived Davidson's role in the boy's death as more inten-
tional if her character was bad 127 and if she was aware of the risk.128
that eating specific types of foods (i.e., healthy as compared to unhealthy) gives rise to
moral judgments about the eater. See, e.g., Richard I. Stein & Carol J. Nemeroff, Moral
Overtones of Food:Judg'ments of Others Based on What They Eat, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 480, 480-81, 489 (1995). Our manipulation check results-that Sara was seen as less
moral based partly on food choices and exercise-is consistent with this evidence. See id.;
see also Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J.
1645, 1777 & n.467 (2004) (quoting Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner on the pro-
posed Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (2005), as
saying, "Don't run off and file a lawsuit if you are fat .... Look in the mirror because
you're the one to blame." (omission in original) (citing Carl Hulse, Vote in House Offers a
Shield in Obesity Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al)).
122 Cronbach's alpha = .92.
123 F(l, 181) = 10.77; p < .01; rTp2 = .040.
124 This difference was only marginally statistically significant. F(l, 181) = 4.32; p = .08;
Op = .016. The interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statisti-
cally significant. F(l, 181) < 1.
125 F(1, 181) = 6.83; p < .01; qp = .036.
126 This difference was only marginally statistically significant. Fi, 181) = 2.94; p =.08;
t/p = .016. The interaction between moral character and awareness of risk was not statisti-
cally significant. l, 181) < 1.
127 Rl, 181) = 19.74; p < .001; r7p2 = .091.
128 RNI, 181) = 16.75; p < .001; qp 2 = .077.
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FIGURE 7.
EXPERIMENT 3: MEAN RATINGS OF SARA DIVIDSON'S
OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEATH OF THE Boy,
BY MORAL CHARACTER AND AWARENESS
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
T
Aware Unaware
Good B ad]
An interaction, 2 9 illustrated in Figure 9, qualified these effects. Par-
ticipants perceived Davidson with both bad character and awareness
of risk as acting with the highest degree of intentionality; participants
inferred less intentionality, however, where either awareness or good
character was lacking. Finally, participants' perceived foreseeability of
the boy's death varied, not surprisingly, by whether Davidson was
aware of the risk.' 30 We observed no effect, however, of moral charac-
ter on perceptions of foreseeability' 3 ' and no interaction between
moral character and foreseeability.13 2
4. Discussion
In this third experiment, we attempted to more cleanly separate
motive from character and to hold constant the social-welfare conse-
quences of the risky conduct. In Experiment 1, the chemicals for
manufacturing methamphetamine signaled Frank Brady's bad moral
129 F1, 181) = 3.99; p < .05; r = .018.
130 F(1, 181) = 34.70; p < .001; rp = .162; Aware of Risk (M = 4.77); Unaware of Risk
(M = 3.32).
131 (1, 181) = 0.07; p = .78.
132 (1, 181) = 2.31; p = .36.
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FIGURE 8.
EXPERIEMENT 3: EXTENT TO WHICH SARA DvIVDSON WAS
PERCEIVED TO HAVE CAUSED THE Boy's DEATH
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Aware Unaware
Good Bad
character, but the chemicals also were his reason for creating the haz-
ardous situation that started the fire and led to the pilots' deaths. In
Experiment 2, Sam Norton's motive for storing the flammable oxygen
signaled his moral character (bad, neutral, or good), but it was also
his reason that created the hazardous situation that led to the explo-
sion and the death. In Experiment 3, Sara Davidson's traits of gener-
osity, sociability, and even physical fitness, rather than her possible
motive or purpose for owning dogs, signaled her moral character. In
other words, we separated the moral character signal from the hazard-
ous situation Davidson created. Thus, unlike Brady's and Norton's
motives, Davidson's motive for creating the hazardous situation was
independent of the source from which participants could infer her
moral character.
Under these facts, the criminal law would permit an inference of
liability based on the hazardous situation Davidson created but not
based on her personality or lifestyle.13 3 Yet, participants viewed the
boy's death differently depending on whether Davidson was either the
133 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text; cf Bayles, supra note 9, at 7 (explain-
ing that, beyond the conception of mens rea, if an act does not indicate an undesirable
character trait, then blame is inappropriate).
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FIGURE 9.
EXPERIEMENT 3: EXTENT TO WHICH SARA DIVIDSON WAS PERCEIVED
TO HAVE ACTED INTENTIONALLY TOWARD THE Boy's DEATH
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
Aware Unaware
I Good Bad
type of person who ignores her nieces and sits alone watching trashy
TV and eating junk food, or the type of person who spoils her nieces,
volunteers, exercises, and watches her diet. Compared to "good" Da-
vidson, participants perceived "bad" Davidson as more responsible
overall for the boy's death. In accordance with criminal-law theory,
being aware of the risk that the dogs posed to people led to greater
inferences about responsibility.13 4 Interestingly, the effects of bad
character are comparable to the effects of awareness: possessing a bad
character is akin to being reckless to the extent that bad character
gives rise to inferences about blame and responsibility as well as to
inferences about causation. The intentionality data suggest that bad
character motivates unfavorable inferences regarding mental state.
Here, participants perceived Davidson's failure to safeguard unruly
dogs as intent to kill when Davidson was not only aware of the risk but
was also a bad person.
134 See SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, How CRIMINAL LAw WORKS: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTI-
CAL GUIDE 106 (2009) (stating that a criminal defendant who "acts with awareness of a high
and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur" will be criminally responsible for her
actions).
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In this set of experiments, we demonstrate empirically that per-
ceptions of moral character sometimes influences judgments of
blameworthiness. Additionally, this set of studies makes several other
contributions to the literature on blame and character. Our findings
are consistent with Alicke's culpable control model' 3 5-that is, we
demonstrate that negative blame judgments arise not only because of
bad reasons for acting (Experiments 1 and 2), but also because of bad
moral character that is signaled independently from those reasons for
acting (Experiment 3). Alicke argues that bad reasons for acting lead
to greater perceptions of control and more extreme judgments about
blame. 136 We add to this by showing that bad character (apart from
reasons for acting) influences control inferences (such as causation,
intent, and foreseeability) as well as blame judgments. We suggest
that this tendency is rooted in more general theories about motivated
reasoning. Specifically, people are generally motivated to inculpate a
defendant they see as "bad"; this initial motivation leads them to inter-
pret the defendant's transgression in a way that makes it more legally
blameworthy. Conversely, people are generally motivated to excul-
pate a defendant they see as "good," leading them to interpret the
transgression as less legally blameworthy.1 37 Our results are consistent
with the notion that bad moral character prompts an inference to a
desired conclusion, namely, increased blame. Judgments about
greater causal influence and intent are also increased to justify the
blame conclusion, which is likely to follow quickly and intuitively from
the information about the severity of the harm and the moral charac-
ter of the actor.
To further explore the phenomenon of motivated inculpation, in
the following section we discuss its implications for legal doctrine with
a specific focus on criminal law.
135 See Alicke, supra note 39, at 556-58.
136 See id. at 568-69; see also Alicke, supra note 40, at 607-10 (demonstrating that an
actor's prior bad or good behavior influences judgments of blame).
137 The conclusion that good moral character influences blamejudgments in a similar,
but opposite, way as bad moral character is supported by the results of Experiment 2,
which contrasted good and bad moral character with a third neutral moral character con-
dition that acted as a control. Recall that blame judgments for the bad actor were more
severe than the neutral actor; blame judgments for the good actor were less severe than the
neutral actor. The notion that good deeds can license subsequent bad behavior has been
recently demonstrated by Daniel A. Effron & Benoit Monin, Letting People Off the Hook:
When do Good Deeds Excuse Transgressions?, 36 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1618,
1631-33 (2010) (showing that good deeds reduce condemnation when they are in a differ-
ent domain (e.g., crusading against drugs) than the subsequent transgression (e.g., com-
mitting sexual harassment)).
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III
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DOCTRINE
The results of our experiments have implications that branch
into two different strands. The first is that an actor's motive (along
with its implicit suggestions about moral character) can strongly influ-
ence inferences about causation, intent, and blame. The second is
that moral character, inferred independently from an actor's motive
for creating harm (or the conditions that led to harm) can influence
judgments about causation, intent, and blame. Our findings are most
consequential in legal situations when character or motive informa-
tion is most likely to enter the process. In this Article, we have con-
centrated on criminal cases, but character and motive can potentially
sway judgments in any kind of case. For example, an employer being
sued for discrimination might introduce evidence that the employee
has a history of cocaine use, either to provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for firing the employee or simply to try to undercut the em-
ployee's claim for emotional-distress damages. Our experiments focus
on blame attributions for acts that the law treats as criminal, and so we
focus our discussion of implications on criminal law and related issues
in evidence. We specifically examine the implications of our findings
on felony murder, evidentiary issues, criminal statutory interpretation,
and causation.
A. Motive and Felony Murder
In the first two experiments we report in this Article, participants
associated bad motive with more severe judgments of blame and re-
sponsibility than good motive. These findings mapping intuitive no-
tions of blame correspond well with modern definitions of mens
rea. s38 The general hierarchy of mens rea139 corresponds to strongly
held intuitions. The criminal law categorizes intentional killings, for
example, as more serious than reckless killings, which are in turn
more serious than negligent killings. 140 Likewise, outside of a legal
context we are more psychologically inclined to blame (or to blame
more harshly) when a transgressor acted intentionally than when he
acted recklessly or negligently. 141 This hierarchy is so deeply in-
138 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985).
139 See id. § 2.02(2) (identifying "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negli-
gently" as the four levels of culpability).
140 See PILLSBURY, supra note 134, at 157-59.
141 See John M. Darley et al., Doing Wrong Without Creating Harm, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 30, 52 (2010); Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation, Contribution, and
Legal Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265, 284-95 (2001); see also
Carlsmith et al., supra note 4, at 285 (discussing how the "just deserts" theory of punish-
ment dictates that the punishment should be proportional to the harm caused by the
defendant).
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grained that even young children invoke it to mitigate their own re-
sponsibility for harm. 42
Historical conceptions of mens rea required finding an evil pur-
pose in order to impose liability-terms like "vicious will," "wicked-
ness," and "malevolence" were common occurrences in judicial
opinions. 143 One prominent manifestation of this idea is traditional
felony-murder doctrine, in which unforeseen deaths that occur dur-
ing the commission of a felony are treated as murder.144 The basis for
this treatment is the malice that is implicit in the underlying felony. 145
Put differently, the implication underlying the doctrine is that in com-
mitting the felony, the defendant acted with an evil mind or evil pur-
pose such that in doing a bad act the felon has no standing to
complain about being punished for the harmful consequences of her
actions.' 46 This historical conception of mens rea as malice or bad
motive is consistent with the results from the first two experiments,
which show that bad motive is sufficient, in some circumstances, to
justify blame for the harmful consequence even if that consequence is
unanticipated.
Accordingly, public support for the felony-murder rule may stem
from the intuition that anyone committing a felony is by definition
acting with an evil motive that in itself may justify liability for any ensu-
ing harm-even for an unforeseen death.147 By contrast, the law (and
the public) usually deems an innocent person involved in an innocent
activity that leads to a death as simply involved in an accident. 48 That
accident, however, becomes criminally blameworthy when the person
involved was engaged in a morally blameworthy activity. 149 Felony
murder, therefore, is designed to protect society from people acting
for bad reasons-that is, those who engaged in dangerous felonies
that demonstrate a willingness to harm others. 150 The law is much less
likely to find blameworthy a defendant who can demonstrate that he
142 An example of this is when children say, "But I didn't mean to!" See Thomas R.
Shultz et al., Assignment of Moral Responsibility and Punishment, 57 CHILD DEv. 177, 182-83
(1986) (showing that children assign greater moral responsibility to acts involving inten-
ion than to negligence or accident).
143 See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1435 & nn.22-24 (1994).
144 See id. at 1433 ("[T]he felony-murder rule provides that the killing of another
human being in the furtherance of any felonious enterprise constitutes the crime of
murder.").
145 See id. at 1446.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 1472-75.
148 See id. at 1472.
149 See id. at 1472-73; Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 NOTRE DME
L. REV. 965, 1032-46 (2008) (proposing an expressive theory of felony-murder culpability
that punishes values expressed through dangerous actions).
150 See Binder, supra note 149.
29320121
CORNELL LAW REVEW
was really acting for good reasons but got caught up in producing a
dangerous situation.1 5'
Conversely, the absence of evil motive often motivates the crimi-
nal law to recognize various defenses. 152 Most notably, the duress ex-
cuse is based on the notion that punishment is unjustly imposed on
those who acted out of fear for themselves or their loved ones rather
than out of any evil motivation. 153 Similarly, the self-defense justifica-
tion is permitted as a defense to criminal liability when a defendant
can show that he harmed another to avoid harm to himself rather
than out of an evil motive.154
B. Moral Character and Implicit Mental State Requirements
Aspects of motive commonly come into play as necessary to un-
derstand a defendant's mental state, especially where mental state re-
quirements use normatively valenced descriptors like "vicious will,"
"wickedness," and "malevolence." Although these terms might indi-
cate an implicit requirement of bad motive, they might also indicate
an implicit judgment of bad moral character. Historically, certain
crimes involved acts that were viewed as so inherently wrongful that
mens rea was essentially self-proving; the law assumed that any person
who would do such an act acted with a bad intent. 55 Thus, if a killer's
actions evidence an inner wickedness such that he has "an abandoned
and malignant heart," then he is guilty of a more serious grade of
homicide than a killer whose heart was not abandoned and malig-
nant, even if the abandoned-and-malignant heart killing was
unintentional. 156
There is reason to think that the Supreme Court has implicitly
held onto the idea that moral character properly informs the criminal
liability analysis. In cases where the defendant might plausibly offer a
version of events in which he was a good guy who got caught up in a
bad situation, it may be the case that the Court is more demanding of
the government and will more readily read in a specific mens rea re-
quirement, even when it does not appear in the statute being ap-
plied.1 57 Joseph E. Kennedy has argued that this explains the Court's
151 See id. at 1472 ("Wholly accidental killings by otherwise innocent persons are not
criminalized .... [W]e excuse such persons because we can attribute no fault to them.").
152 See Gardner, supra note 29, at 660-67.
153 See id. at 738.
154 See id. at 660-61.
155 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 131 (1878).
156 See id.
157 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604-07, 614-16 (1994) (requiring a
specific mens rea, despite the lack of such a requirement in the relevant statute, for a
defendant who claimed that he was unaware a firearm he possessed was actually a machine
gun); cf Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 194-96, 203-04 (1991) (requiring knowl-
edge that conduct was illegal, even though the statute included a willfulness requirement,
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decision in Staples v. United States,158 in which the Court read a knowl-
edge requirement into a gun-possession statute criminalizing conduct
that could arguably be unknowing and innocent. 15 9 Similarly, in Cheek
v. United States, the Court read into a criminal tax-evasion statute the
requirement that the defendant knew that his actions violated the law
because the tax laws are complex and because it believed that Con-
gress did not intend to deem a person who misunderstands that com-
plexity a criminal. 160 On the other hand, when the crime involves an
inherently wrongful actus reus (for example, robbery) the Court is
hesitant to impose a mental state requirement when it does not explic-
itly appear in the statute. 161 "In this sense," Kennedy argues, "only
those of good character need apply for relief under Staples."'1 6 2
In the experiments we present in this Article, participants per-
ceived a greater degree of intent when the actor's character was bad,
compared to when it was good. In Experiments 1 and 2, Frank Brady
and Sam Norton's bad character was revealed through their bad rea-
sons for storing flammable substances, and participants perceived
these actors as having acted more intentionally toward the victims'
death compared to actors with good reasons for storing them. In Ex-
periment 3, by contrast, Sara Davidson's bad character was indepen-
dent of the dangerous situation she created with her dogs. Despite
her slothful and unhealthy lifestyle, "bad" Davidson displayed the very
same values as "good" Davidson in failing to control her unruly dogs.
Yet this difference in moral character led to inflated perceptions of
"bad" Davidson's intentions. This pattern of results suggests that ob-
servers' evaluations of the actor's moral character influence more
than just straightforward blaming judgments-bad character gives rise
to inferences about more culpable mental states regarding the result-
ing harm.
One account of the Court's reasoning in Staples and in Cheek,
then, is that the Justices perceive the possibility that these respective
for a commercial airline pilot who evaded taxes after "learning" that wages were not taxa-
ble income from lectures by members of a tax protest group).
158 511 U.S. 600. The criminal action at question in this case was for the possession of
a weapon capable of automatically firing. The defendant Staples did not dispute his pos-
session of the weapon but rather claimed that he was unaware of the weapon's ability to
fire automatically. For a discussion of the role of character in this case, see Joseph E.
Kennedy, The Stoy ofStaples v. U.S. and the Innocent Machine Gun Owner: The Good, the Bad,
and the Dangerous, (Univ. N.C. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1596222, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596222. For a more historical discussion, see PILLSBURY,
supra note 48, at 84, which notes that under the mens rea requirements of the English
common law, "[t] he language was that of character judgment, and courts assumed that in
judging the criminal conduct they were making character assessments as well."
159 See Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1.
160 498 U.S. at 199-201.
161 See Kennedy, supra note 158, at 35-36.
162 Id. at 36.
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defendants are being good people acting for good reasons, with the
absence of the level of culpability that is otherwise required for serious
felonies such as the ones that were at issue in these two cases. Percep-
tions of these defendants' good character may have motivated the Jus-
tices to blame these defendants lightly. Requiring a high level of
mental culpability is consistent with this desire for light blame in these
two instances. The result, then, is a rule imputing a mens rea element
in these two particular offenses.
This account shares some similarities with the moral-evaluation
conception of emotion in criminal law discussed earlier.163 The
moral-evaluation account holds that impassioned offenders' emotions
express values, and our evaluation of the goodness or badness of those
values leads to our appraisal of full blame, mitigation, or exonera-
tion. 164 Similarly, the Court in Staples and in Cheek evaluated those
defendants' respective motives as non-evil, and interpreted the respec-
tive statutes as requiring proof of conscious wrongdoing with the end
result that liability was less likely. Finally, the participants in all three
experiments discussed here evaluated the goodness or badness of the
actor's character, perceived their mental state as less or more inten-
tional, and blamed them less or more, respectively. 165
C. Moral Character in Evidence
Our experiments also have particularly potent practical implica-
tions for the treatment of character evidence in criminal trials. Our
findings highlight the highly influential potential of evidence of bad
character, even when it is only tangentially related to the crime at
hand. Our results further substantiate the concerns expressed by the
judges that first crafted and applied the common-law ban on charac-
163 See text accompanying notes 49-50.
164 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 49.
165 There is an important difference, however, between the moral-evaluation concep-
tion and the account of motivated moral reasoning that we suggest accounts for at least
some of our results. See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law: An Essay
Inspired by Bill Stuntz, in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ESSAYS ON THEMES
OF WILLIAMJ. STUNTZ (Michael Klarman et al. eds., forthcoming 2012). According to the
moral-evaluation conception developed by Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, guilt
assessments flow from jurors' perceptions of the moral quality of the defendant's emo-
tions, regardless of whether those emotions may have reduced the defendant's ability to
freely choose to act. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 49. By contrast, Kahan, offers a
"cognitive conception" of moral evaluation, in which jurors' moral evaluations of a defen-
dant's emotions influence their perceptions of volition, which in turn drive guilt assess-
ments. See Kahan, supra. Thus, a defendant whose emotions betray atrocious values is
perceived as acting with full volitional capacity, and is judged fully guilty. See id. In these
experiments we examine character and mens rea rather than emotion and volition, but the
upshot is consistent with Kahan's "cognitive conception" of moral evaluation. In our ex-
periments, participants evaluated the actor's moral character, which influenced both
blame judgments as well as perceptions of intentionality. Actors with bad character were
seen as having acted more intentionally and were assessed as more blameworthy.
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ter evidence. 166 These findings are also consistent with other empiri-
cal work suggesting that the likelihood of conviction increases if a
defendant's prior crimes are admitted into evidence. 167
Restrictions on character evidence are primarily targeted at evi-
dence meant to prove the defendant's propensity to conform his con-
duct to his bad moral character. 168 There are, however, several
exceptions to this general rule. For example, Congress and several
states allow evidence of any past sexual transgressions to be admitted
in cases involving child molestation or sexual assault. 169 A few states
allow the presentation of propensity evidence in cases involving do-
mestic abuse. 170 Also, if a defendant chooses to testify as a witness, the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow the prosecutor to present character
evidence in the form of "[o]pinion and reputation evidence" that im-
pugns the credibility of the witnesses.j 7 ' And, as discussed above,
some character evidence can be introduced as motive in order to
prove mens rea.172 Although the Federal Rules of Evidence classify
evidence relating to motive as noncharacter evidence, 173 juries are
166 See, e.g., State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 289 (1876) ("The very fact that a man is
charged with a crime is sufficient to create in many minds a belief that he is guilty. It is
quite inconsistent with that fairness of trial to which every man is entitled, that the jury
should be prejudiced against him by any evidence except what relates to the issue; above
all it should not be permitted to blacken his character . . ").
167 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1357, 1380-85 (finding a significant
association between the jury's learning of a criminal record and conviction in cases with
weak evidence).
168 See FED. R. EviD. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion ...."); Norman Krivosha et al., Relevancy: The Necessary Element in Using Evidence of
Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REv. 657, 664 (1981) (tracing the
roots of the common-law ban on character evidence to the 1810 English case Rex v. Cole)
(citing Julius Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARV. L. REv.
954, 959, 960-61 (1933)); see also KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 311 (6th
ed. 2006) (defining character evidence as "evidence offered solely to prove a person acted
in conformity with a trait of character on a given occasion"); Sherry F. Colb, "Whodunit"
Versus "What was Done": When to Admit Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV.
939, 941 (2001) ("The rule prohibits the introduction of character evidence to prove that
an individual acted in conformity with his character on the occasion in question.");Julius
Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L. REv. 988, 989
(1938) ("So great, runs the thought, was the solicitude of the common law to avoid damn-
ing the accused with prejudice, diffusion, and confusion of issues that, however relevant
and on whatever issue, similar facts and, above all, similar bad acts of the accused were
never admitted.").
169 See FED. R. EviD. 413-15; see also ThomasJ. Reed, Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of
Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 159 (1993) (dis-
cussing state law exceptions to character-evidence rules in sexual-assault and child-molesta-
tion cases).
170 See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women,
36 IND. L. REv. 687, 700-02 & n.44 (2003).
171 FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
172 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
173 See FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
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likely to extrapolate information about character from evidence about
a person's priorities, choices, and motivations. 174 Thus, "what we reg-
ulate as 'character evidence' is only a small part of the evidence and
arguments that lawyers use to develop competing versions of the char-
acters of the actors in the events that are subject to litigation.' 1 75 De-
spite procedural efforts to control the influence of character evidence
in criminal trials, the competing narratives that prosecutors and de-
fense attorneys use in criminal cases are largely concerned with con-
veying a distinct impression of the character of the parties involved in
the case. 176 As a result of all this, characterizations about the moral
character of the parties continue to enter trials in various ways. 177
D. Moral Character and Proximate Cause
One distinctive feature of the vignettes tested in the three experi-
ments we report here is that they all involved a force that intervened
between the actors' initial actions and the harms that resulted. For
Frank Brady, a negligent pilot flew in the wrong direction; for Sam
Norton, a youth tossed a burning cigarette butt onto dry leaves; for
Sara Davidson, her dogs attacked a young boy. These types of situa-
tions raise the issue of proximate cause, a doctrine that helps observ-
ers attach blame to an actor for some causes and withhold blame from
actors for other, more remote, causes. 178
174 See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 754-55
(1998) (noting that in the context of limiting instructions about character evidence, it is
hard for juries to be "consistent in resisting common sense"); Peter Tillers, What is Wrong
with Character Evidence?, 49 HASTINGS LJ. 781, 810, 825 (1998) (suggesting that a connec-
tion exists between motive and character insofar as "human creatures have an internal
system of rules, principles, or operations that regulates... or organizes their behavior" and
"it is logically permissible to suppose that 'character' is 'caused' by matters such as 'choice'
and 'decision'").
175 Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability
Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 845-46 (1998).
176 See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don't Want to Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the Narrative
Model ofJudging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 429, 430, 473-75 ("[L]egitimate criminal condemna-
tion demands complete, rich, narrative trials."); Jim M. Perdue, Winning with Stories: Using
the Narrative to Persuade in Trials, Speeches & Lectures, 69 TEX. B.J. 984, 990 (2006) (arguing
that "[a] trial story is all about character"); Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI.
L. REv. 737, 738 (1997) (reviewing LAw's STORIES: NARRATWE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (characterizing trials as competitions between
stories, where the "[p]laintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a story . . . and the jury
chooses the story that it likes better")).
177 For a discussion of these various ways see, for example, Tillers, supra note 174 and
Park, supra note 174.
178 See Welch v. State, 235 So. 2d 906, 907 (Ala. 1970) ("Mankind might still be in
Eden, but for Adam's biting an apple.").
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As a criminal-law doctrine, proximate (legal) cause is notorious
for its lack of specific standards to guide outcomes. 179 The proximate-
cause inquiry typically focuses on one or more of the following stan-
dards: the remoteness of the result, the foreseeability of the result, the
extent to which the result seems accidental, and the degree of depen-
dence of the result on another person's act.180 These factors, how-
ever, are difficult to apply with any degree of precision, and the
inquiry typically collapses, either implicitly or explicitly, into a norma-
tive one about whether it seems just to hold the actor morally respon-
sible for the result under the circumstances. 18 1 The Model Penal
Code gestures toward the normative inquiry when it specifies that the
result must be "not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have
a Uust] bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his
offense."182
A cursory look at familiar criminal-law proximate-cause cases
reveals a connection between blameworthiness and liability when we
view those cases through the lens of moral character and motive
rather than through more traditional notions of remoteness and fore-
seeability. For example, in a case where the defendants robbed the
victim and left him passed-out drunk on the side of a dark rural high-
way, the court found that the robbers proximately caused the death of
the victim who was run over by a passing car. 18 3 In another case, the
defendant led police on a dangerous forty-eight-mile high-speed high-
way chase that resulted in the death of a pursuing police helicopter
pilot; the appellate court upheld the finding of proximate cause.
184
But where the defendant participated in a drag race where both cars
crashed through a guardrail and the driver of the other car died, the
appellate court reversed the conviction on proximate-cause
grounds. 185
Arguably, these results fit within the pattern found in our experi-
ments: the worse the moral character of the defendant, as inferred
from the defendant's choice of activity, the more likely we are to hold
him criminally liable for the harm. Admittedly, this is an extremely
small, nonrandomly selected sample of proximate-cause cases. Note,
however, that causation was one of the attributes participants in our
179 See Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause Decoded, 50 UCLA L. REv. 293, 294 (2002)
(" [Mlany believe that proximate cause is basically incoherent, that its cases cannot be pre-
dicted, and even that they illustrate some fundamental disorder of the common law.").
180 See PAUL H. ROBINSON CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 260 (2d ed.
2008).
181 See id.
182 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(b), (3) (b) (1985) (alterations in original).
183 See People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773, 776-77 (N.Y. 1974).
184 See People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117, 120, 129 (Ct. App. 1991).
185 See Velazquez v. State, 561 So. 2d 347, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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experiments rated; in all three experiments, participants gave higher
causation ratings to actors with bad moral character. 186
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants' perception of causation was
arguably consistent with proximate-cause doctrine, at least in its more
explicitly normative form. In both of these experiments, when the
actor had a nefarious motive for storing flammable substances, his ac-
tions were perceived to be a stronger cause of death than when he
had an acceptable motive. Arguably, the law of proximate cause ac-
counts for these judgments: death resulting from exploding chemicals
is arguably not too remote or accidental to have a just bearing on
liability when the actor's motive is nefarious, such as
methamphetamine production or football cheating. At the same
time, when the actor's motive is virtuous, death from exploding chem-
icals is arguably closer to being too remote or accidental to have ajust
bearing on liability. This is closely analogous to the Model Penal
Code's definition of recklessness, which takes into account the "na-
ture and purpose" of the defendant's conduct for the purpose of de-
termining whether the defendant's conduct constituted a "gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor's situation."' 8 7 Under each doctrine, the
assessment of the moral quality of the values driving the actor's con-
duct leads directly to judgments of causation or recklessness, as the
case may be.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
In these experimental studies, we demonstrate that a transgres-
sor's motive for acting can influence judgments of blame, responsibil-
ity, causation, and intention. We also show that perceptions of a
transgressor's moral character can influence judgments of blame, re-
sponsibility, causation, and intention. We certainly do not claim, how-
ever, that motive and moral character always influence blame-related
judgments. The influence of motive and moral character is subject to
limitations, and we have not yet explored the contours of these
boundary conditions. For example, intentionality is one likely limita-
tion on the relationship between motive and moral character on the
one hand, and blame related judgments on the other. Note that the
actors in each of the three experiments reported here caused harm
unintentionally: Frank Brady stored flammable chemicals which led to
the unintentional death of a firefighter; Sam Norton stored oxygen
which led to the unintentional death of a youth; Sara Davidson kept
186 Note that in Experiment 3, the mean difference in causality rating between good
Sara Davidson and bad Sara Davidson did not reach conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance. See supra note 126.
187 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
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unruly and dangerous dogs which led to the unintentional death of a
child. These narrow circumstances of recklessly or negligently caused
deaths contain features that influence individuals in the blaming pro-
cess to consider the actor's motive and moral character. We will dis-
cuss a few of them here.
First, when the harm of a transgression is severe, such as when a
victim dies, our drive to blame kicks into high gear.18 8 More severe
harm influences us to make not only more severe judgments of pun-
ishment, but also to more likely find that the actor is responsible for
the consequences of his harmful action. 189 For example, when people
read a story about a bank robber whose bullet misses the teller but
ricochets and hits a customer, they are likely to judge the robber as
more responsible, more reckless, and his action more causal when the
injury is severe than when it is mild.190 In cases like this, a harm-based
version of retributivism can explain why punishment should increase
with severity of harm. That liability judgments should become more
likely with severity of harm is more puzzling but nonetheless conso-
nant with the notion that we generally treat more severe harm more
harshly.191 Thus, because of the severity of the harm in our three ex-
periments, our participant perceivers were highly motivated to blame.
As a result, they were especially motivated to search for information
that could justify this impulse. Bad motive and bad character might
have fit this need.
Second, when an actor's mental state is ambiguous, we often find
it difficult to gauge that actor's blameworthiness. Conversely, when
an actor's mental state is unambiguous, we assign or withhold blame
more easily. When a wrongdoer kills another person intentionally, for
188 SeeJennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of "Responsibility": A Meta-
Analytic Review, 30J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2575, 2579-81 (2000); Solan & Darley, supra
note 141, at 282.
189 See Mark D. Alicke et al., A Posteriori Adjustment of A Priori Decision Criteria, 12 Soc.
COGNITION 281, 282, 303-06 (1994); Robbennolt, supra note 188, at 257. But cf Loran F.
Nordgren & Mary-Hunter Morris McDonnell, The Scope-Severity Paradox: Why Doing More
Harm Is Judged to Be Less Harmful, 2 Soc. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY Sci. 97, 97 (2011) (find-
ing an inverse correlation between harm to victims and punishment in cases where there is
more than one victim and the victims are not readily identifiable).
190 See D. Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attribution of
Responsibility, 2 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76, 84 (1974). Relatedly, observers are some-
times more likely to blame the defendant depending on the victim's physical attractiveness,
race, or gender. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote, Sentencing in Homicide Cases
and the Role of Vengeance, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 363, 364-65 (2003); Norbert L. Kerr, Beautiful
and Blameless: Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on Mock Jurors' Verdicts, 4 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 479, 479 (1978).
191 See Robbennolt, supra note 188, at 2601. When no immediate injury occurs but the
potential for future harm exists (such as an increased risk of stroke in the future), people
do not award full compensation. Instead, many prefer to reserve the right to compensate,
via an escrow mechanism, should the injury later materialize. See Darley et al., supra note
141, at 59.
2012]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
example, we know to assign a great deal of blame; 192 the wrongdoer's
moral character would likely have minimal influence on our blame
perceptions. Note here, however, that we are discussing judgments of
blame and responsibility rather than punishment judgments. 193 A
cold-blooded killer whom people perceive as having a good character
might receive less punishment than if they perceive his character as
bad; even so, judgments of responsibility and blame for the killing
might not reflect any difference in moral character. 194
The picture likely changes, at least to some degree, when we turn
from moral character to motive. The influence of motive on blame
judgments could perhaps still emerge in the context of an actor who
intentionally causes death. We might perceive a person who kills art-
other out of greed (for example, for inheritance money) as more
blameworthy than one who is driven by mercy (for example, killing a
terminally ill and suffering loved one). This will be an important
question to explore in future work, and for now we are limited to
mere speculation. Outside of this extreme example, however, it may
be that we assign little weight in our blame judgments to an actor's
motive when that actor acts intentionally because the intentional
mental state overwhelms other influences like motive and moral
character.
Our analysis of boundary conditions is speculative but is sup-
ported by findings in the context of the influence of propensity evi-
dence (such as prior crimes) on jury verdicts. Recall that Eisenberg
and Hans found that juries who learned of a defendant's prior crimi-
nal record were more likely to convict when the overall evidence was
relatively weak. 195 Thus, the weight of other factors can easily over-
whelm the influence of similar prior acts, and by extension, perhaps
also the influence of moral character and motive on guilt judgments
and blame judgments.
The twin notions of legal guilt and moral blame give rise, perhaps
surprisingly, to an important distinction. The propensity studies dis-
cussed at the beginning of this Article suggest that a jury which learns
about a criminal defendant's prior crimes is more likely to return a
guilty verdict in the case for which the jury is empaneled. 196 These
192 See Bertram F. Malle, Intentionality, Morality, and Their Relationship in Human Judg-
ment, 6J. COGNITION & CULTURE 87, 102-05 (2006) (finding that when people evaluate a
negative action, they are especially sensitive to issues about the intentionality of that
action).
193 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1109, 1137-61 (2008) (exploring reasons why criminal sentencing takes bad but not
good acts into account).
194 Cf Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 49, at 368-72 (discussing the role of mercy in
determinations of criminal guilt compared to moral blameworthiness).
195 See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 15, at 1380-85.
196 See supra notes 15-19.
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findings are subject to certain limitations. For example, if the prior
crime is very dissimilar to the one at issue or is not serious, the influ-
ence of the propensity information on the jury's verdict diminishes or
disappears. Likewise, the influence of propensity information on ini-
tial individual juror preferences can dissipate when jurors deliberate
and reach a group verdict. 197
Taken as a whole, the focus of this body of research is different,
and also more specific, than our aim in the experiments we discuss in
this Article. Whereas the propensity studies focus on the influence of
prior crimes, we focus on the influence of two constructs that are
broader in scope: moral character and motive. It may well be the case
that prior crimes serve as a proxy for moral character information so
that prior crimes is simply a subset of the set of information that gives
rise to inferences about moral character. It might alternatively be the
case that the influence of prior crimes works through a slightly differ-
ent mechanism that draws more on processes of analogical reasoning
than does the influence of moral character. Recall that the serious-
ness of the prior crime is not the only dimension along which the
influence of prior crimes varies; similarity of prior crime might well be
an influence that operates independently of seriousness. Although
observers could logically interpret the seriousness of an actor's prior
crime as a proxy for his moral character, observers are unlikely to do
the same with regard to crime similarity as an independent
dimension.
One important point in this Article is that the focus of the experi-
ments reported here is quite different than the focus of the earlier
research on prior crimes as propensity evidence. In addition, the ob-
jects of influence are different in our research as well. The earlier
propensity-evidence studies focused almost exclusively on judgments
of guilt-either in the form of individual mock-juror judgments, or
mock-jury verdicts. In the current experiments, by contrast, we are
interested not specifically in guilt judgments or punishment, but
rather in basic psychological processes of blame and responsibility.
To be sure, these basic processes play a key role in verdicts. But their
importance goes beyond modeling jury behavior. Human beings in-
side and outside of the jury box often make intuitive judgments of
blame and responsibility very quickly and automatically as they first
process the story about a transgression.1 9 8 Our initial inclinations
197 See Clary & Shaffer, supra note 17, at 645-50.
198 SeeJonathan Haidt & Selin Kesebir, Morality, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIL PSYCHOLOGY
797, 803 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010). There is some evidence that analytic
circuitry of the brain (right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) is involved when people make
certain kinds of judgments about criminal responsibility; at the same time, punishment-
magnitude judgments involve emotional circuitry (right amygdala). See Joshua W. Buck-
holtz et al., The Neural Correlates of Third-Party Punishment, 60 NEURON 930, 934 (2008).
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about whether to categorize the person that we are judging as "good"
or "bad" can motivate us to blame or exculpate him or her. This ini-
tial motivation, in turn, can influence our interpretation of the per-
son's actions in a way that allows us to excuse their responsibility or to
find them blameworthy for the harm they caused. These quick, ini-
tial, intuitive blame judgments are also likely to play a key role in how
potential litigants perceive a harm-relevant event, how parties ap-
proach dispute-resolution processes, and outside of the legal system,
how ordinary people interact when faced with a perceived wrong.
As our studies demonstrate, however, motivated inculpation can
also enter into the criminal context, where the law has tried-through
the imposition of formalized processes-to separate liability from
character-based inferences. Even here, when we hold constant all
other aspects of the harm an action causes and the situation in which
the harm occurs, the actor's perceived moral character or bad reasons
for acting can still color the way that we determine discrete compo-
nents of criminal liability like knowledge, mental state, and
foreseeability.
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